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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
This study reports on th.e behavior of experimental 
markets in which the buyers were ignorant (unless truthfully 
informed by sellers) of the true quality of the good 
purchased until after the sale. The experimental design 
ensured that buyers would be willing to pay more than the 
extra cost of high quality, so an efficient market would 
contain no low quality "lemons". In this first section, we 
explain, in a nontechnical way, why we studied "lemons" 
markets, why we chose to use ~xperiments and designed them 
as we did, what the results were and what we believe we 
have learned. 
In recent years, economists have intensively studied the 
question of how markets function when buyers and sellers 
have different degrees of ignorance. A well known 
theoretical model (Akerlof, 1970) demonstrates that when 
buyers are ignorant of quality before purchase, "bad" quality 
will drive out "good". This can happen even when buyers are 
willing to pay the extra 'Cost of higher quality. Such 
markets will ultimately consist only of low quality products 
or "lemons". This is an example of an "informational market 
failure," since the inefficiency arises from the sellers' 
inability or unwillingness to effectively communicate their 
information about product quality to the buyers. 
Other economic models focus on the incentive sellers 
have to develop a "reputation" for high quality (Nelson, 1970, 
1974; Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1982a-c) or to use 
devices such as warranties (Grossman, 1981) to reduce 
inefficiencies in markets where buyers arc ignorant of quality 
until after the sale. These theories· predict that, under 
certain conditions, the lemons problem can be overcome by 
seller incentives to develop reputations or to offer warranties 
that can serve an as effective signal of quality. 
Another approach (not necessarily an alternative one) to 
dealing with informational market failure problems is through 
consumer protection regulations of the type enforced by the 
FTC. The government can penalize "unfair and deceptive" 
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advertisemeMs, require that -certain types of disdosures be 
made (h,ealth warnings for cigarettes, truth-in-lending 
requirements or ~are labeling) or require that certain 
post-purchase rights be given to all buyers ( a 3 day "cool-
ing-off" period or a minimum warranty). Such regulations 
are not free. Compliance costs may be significant; regulation 
may have negative unintended consequences; enforcement may 
be expensive for firms and taxpayers alike. At least one 
economist with considerable expertise (Nelson, 1974) has 
asserted that laws against deceptive advertising are 
unnecessary and probably lead to an increase in deceptive 
advertising. A noted legal scholar (then professor, now 
Judge), Richard Posner, wrote that although under certain 
conditions an "intellectual" case could be made for FTC 
advertising regulations 
... the commission has never developed a theory defining 
the circumstances under which "Serious advertising abuses 
are likely to occur and where resources should therefore 
be concentrated. Without such a theory it cannot hope 
to improve, on average, the functioning of the markets 
that it regulates. [ 1973, pp. 31-32] 
While students of regulation disagree on the extent to 
which -consumer protection is needed to overcome what would 
otherwise be market inefficiencies, all would agree that little 
is known about how the nebulous notion of "reputation" 
might or might not help to correct potential inefficiencies. 
It is therefore useful to dis,cover conditions in which 
market incentives to provide reputations and warranties are 
highly likely or highly unlikely to eliminate inefficiencies 
caused by lack of information. The purpose of the 
experiments reported here is to add to the rather small stock 
of knowledge on this difficult question. 
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Asymmetric Information and ~TC Consumer Protection Policy 
Much e~onomic r~ear<h dealing with informational 
problems does so under the label of markets with "asymmetric 
information." The term is deliberately neutral as to whether 
it is buyer or seller, consumer -0r producer, who is relatively 
ignorant concerning the transaction. Consumer protection 
policy, however, is often premised on the belief that it is the 
consumer who lacks relevant information and is therefore at 
a disadvantage relative to the professionals they have to deal 
with. Of course, almost everyone is both a consumer and a 
producer. Thus, the premise applies to everyone, but only in 
their role as consumers. It may be worthwhile to review 
some basic arguments advanced to show why it is useful to 
distinguish between "consumer" and "producer" and why the 
consumer will often have less information than the producer.1 
Is there any fundamental reason to think that the same 
people who are sophisticated in their money-making activities 
are "backward in the art of spending money?" Wesley Clair 
Mitchell, one of the twentieth century's most distinguished 
economists, provided an insightful answer long before the 
term "consumer protection" was in common use. Mit~hell 
contrasted the consumer to the merchant in the following 
terms: 
"Ignorance of qualities, uncertainty of taste, lack of 
accounting, carelessness about prices--faults that would 
ruin a merchant--prevail in our housekeeping." 
[Mitchell, 1912, p.3] 
1 There are, of course, numerous cases . where the 
"consumer" will have more information than the "producer". 
For example, an individual seeking insurance coverage will 
generally have more information about his own risk 
characteristics than the insurer; an applicant for credit will 
have more information about his past credit history than the 
lender. 
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Why? Mitchell's basic explanation for the asymmetry was 
that while the family had been replaced by the "vastly more 
efficient business enterprise" as the basic unit of 
production, it remained the basic unit of consumption or of 
spending money. 
"So long as the family remains the most important unit for 
spending money, so long will the art of spending money lag 
the art of making money." [ibid.,p.6] 
Because of the great variety of items an individual or 
family buys, expert knowledcge cannot be attained in more 
than a f cw of these markets; because of the small scale of 
purchases of individual items, little testing of any item can 
be done; limited storage and limited time to plan mean that 
items often must be bought in haste. Families are too small 
to achieve either economies of specialization or scale in 
consumption. In addition, Mitchell ar,gued that the forces of 
competition do not operate between families in the way they 
operate between business enterprises. 
" ... the masterful housewife cannot win away the husbands 
of slack managers as the masterful merchant can win 
away the customers of the less able. What ability in 
spending money is developed among scattered individuals, 
we dam up within the walls of a single household". 
[ibid., p. 10] 
Mitchell goes on to give several other reasons for the 
relative backwardness of spending (e.g. scientific progress has 
been greatest in ar,eas related to production, intra-family 
decisions involve tradeoffs that are difficult to reduce to 
dollar magnitudes so no effective accounting system exists 
for family decisions), and concludes that while there are 
some prospects for improvement in the art of spending 
money, they are modest. 
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Types of Goods and Consumer Ignorance 
The upshot of all this is that "informational asymmetry" 
will be common in markets for consumer products and that it 
will often be the consumer who is relatively ignorant. The 
practical significance of this asymmetry depends partly on 
the nature of the product. Some product characteristics are 
immediately apparent, like the color of a blouse. These are 
often 'Called "search" (Nelson, 1970) or external characterist-
ics. They will generally be known to the buyer before 
purchase and so there is no asymmetry at the time of sale. 
Other aspects of a good or service are usually learned 
about by using or "experiencing" the product, perhaps over 
an extended period of time. These are called "experience" or 
internal characteristics. Examples are the taste of a partic-
ular brand of coffee, the durability and reliability of a car, 
the rate of return on a money market fund. 
Clearly, some characteristics are neither search nor 
experience. In the normal course of smoking, one would not 
uncover a connection between smoking and can"Cer. Without 
doing controUed experiments, it is difficult to determine 
whether a particular brand of aspirin is effective in reducing 
headache pains; whether a relatively more expensive brand is 
ll..Qn<. effective than a "store" brand; whether a gasoline 
additive really increases mileage, etc. Such aspects (where 
an additional specific cost must be incurred to assess quality) 
are ref erred to as "hidden" or "credence" characteristics. 
Clearly, all of these distinctions: "search", "experience·" and 
"hidden", are based on special cases of what Charles Babbage 
( 1832) called the cost of verifying the fact that the article 
you wish to purchase has the "degree of goodness" you 
expect. Verification of quality usually takes time, effort and 
money. Search and experience characteristics are special 
because verification of their quality is a by-product of either 
examining or using articles, and thus involve no special 
effort or expense to "test" their qualities. "'Hidden" 
characteristics cover the very broad area left over; they take 
some special effort to verify quality. 
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Whether the almost ineviuble asymmetry in product 
knowledge between consumer and produ~er will lead w 
significant ineffiency thus depends on the characteristics of 
the 1)roduct. There is a "commonsense" belief among some 
legal scholars and economists that serious market information 
.problems are unlikely to occur with search products or with 
experience products that are purchased relatively frequently. 
Thus, informational mark.et failures, if they are ever 
significant, would be expect-ed to occur in products with 
"hidden" characteristics or in products with experience 
characteristics that are purchased infrequently. Since the 
experimental results reported here suggest that information 
problems can arise even in markets for frequently purchased 
experience goods, it may be useful to develop the various 
views held on these markets in more detail. 
Experience Goods and Reputation 
The views of two leading legal scholars were presented in 
a 1979 debate concerning the desirability of mandatory 
disclosure programs. Robert Pitofsky, a former Director of 
the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection, later an FTC 
Commissioner, and now a professor at the Georgetown 
University School of Law, argued that some such programs 
were desirable and successful. He began, however, by saying 
that, "market incentives are generally adequate to produce 
most key product information through advertising, ... " and 
that the question worth addressing is whether "situations 
would ever occur" wherein a seller with a superior product 
would not have incentives to use the advertising media to 
inform the public of his superiority. 
Pitofsky identified several such situations among which 
were: when a serious hidden hazard exists equally in all 
products (e.g., cholesterol content of eggs, cancer risk with 
smoking for cigarettes with approximately equal 
tar/nicotine/carbon monoxide content) and (2) where fraud 
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can pay be~ause the item is generally a on«-in-a-lifetime 
purchase (encyclopedias, h<:aring aids).2 
On the other side· was Richard Posner, th<: author of 
the dissenting statement to the influential ABA Commission 
to Study the FTC, who was then a professor at the 
University of Chi<:ago Law School and is now a federal 
judge. Posner pointed to two -situations where the danger 
of misrepresentation is substantial. First, the case of a 
"costly or infrequently purchased product" that has "an 
important -characteristic that is not apparent on casual 
inspection" (i.e., an expensive or infrequently purchased non-
search good); second, the case of a "product, whether chea,p 
or expensive, whether frequently or infrequently purchased, 
which has an important characteristic which may remain 
hidden to th<: consumer throughout a long period of use." 
The latter he refers to as a "well hidden characteristic." 
There is substantial agreement; both men point to 
hidden characteristics3 and the lack of seUer incentive to 
encourage repeat sales as key elements that might justify 
mandatory disclosure. By inference, neither believes there 
would be any significant market failure in experience good 
markets, so long as there is relatively frequent repurchase. 
Neither Posner, nor Pitofsky provide an analysis of why 
firms would find it in their interest to develop "good" 
reputations in repeat purchase experience good markets. 
Their arguments seem to rest on a "commonsense" basis that 
2 Pitofsky mentions two other situations, where firms 
can use labeling to confuse <:omparison shopping and where a 
firm has considerable market power, but does not discuss 
either one further. 
3 Although both cited "hidden characteristics" as a 
source of potential problems, they did not agree on specific 
examples of them. Posner rejected all of Pitofsky's examples 
cited in the text above. 
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sellers 'Can be successful only if they achieve repeat sales 
and they can win repeat sales only by providing good value. 
Casual observation also suggests that fewer problems and 
complaints arise concerning experience characteristics of 
frequently purchased goods than for the other types of 
goods. 
Economists have also emphasized the importance of 
repeat sales in providing firms with appropriate incentives to 
behave efficiently, and, in addition, they have tried to build 
explicit analytical models of experience good markets. In the 
process, howev,er, they have uncovered certain difficulties 
that suggest that reputation development is not quite as 
simple as the common sense notion would suggest. 
Nelson (1970, 1974) coined the term "experience good" 
in what was perhaps the first attempt to analytically model a 
market for such goods. His str,ess was on the important role 
that advertising could play in reducing the costs of 
consumers in identifying high quality sellers without the 
necessity of experimenting with different sellers to locate 
those who were supplying the best quality for a given price. 
He argued that since sellers who provide high quality relative 
to price in an experience good market will have higher 
repeat sales than low quality firms, they will place a higher 
value on convincing a consumer to "try" their product. 
Because higher quality firms value new customers more than 
lower quality firms, they will advertise more. Consumers will 
then use advertising as a "signal" for quality, since the fact 
that one firm advertises more than another indicates that the 
first values customers more than the second. The content of 
the advertising message itself is almost irrelevant. The real 
information being conveyed to the Nelson consumer is that 
the owners of the brand name are willing and able to spend 
a lot of money advertising. 
In Nelson's model, then, no inefficiency is caused by 
buyer ignorance of quality before purchase. Experien·ce 
goods markets will work in the commonsense way sketched 
above, and furthermore, the cost of experimenting to discover 
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quality will be reduced or eliminated by the role <>f 
advertising as a signal of quality. Prices wiU reflect the 
cost of advertising but will be just high enough to allow 
sellers of any quality a normal profit. " 
Later writers found a fundamental problem in combining 
the com·mon sense notion of reputation with the economist's 
model of competition as Nelson tried to do. Even though 
providing higher quality leads to greater repeat sales, a seller 
may find it more profitable to "cheat" by supplying low 
quality at a high price. If selling low quality items is just 
as profitable as selling high quality items and if one does not 
need a good reputation to sell low quality items, then 
cheating will pay. Selling one or more low quality units at a 
high quality price yields an extra profit which is not in any 
way off set by being "r~duced" to selling at low quality prices 
forever after. To maximize profits, all sellers would try to 
cheat, but buyers would quickly be unwilling to pay any price 
above that for the lowest quality. The result would be a 
"lemons" market. 
Thus, there is a contradiction between a competitive 
model that implies that price will be equal to marginal cost 
for all sellers regardless of quality and a reputation model 
that requires that there be a price premium for quality and 
that this premium increase with increasing quality. More 
generally, there is a potential conflict between competitive 
" Nelson's model, like many innovations, was in-
complete. He did not "solve" the model for optimal prices, 
qualities and advertising messages. He did, however, assume 
that competition would ensure that, on average, total profits 
for equally efficient firms and profits per customer would be 
the same for both high and low quality sellers (1974, p.753). 
But if the seller's profit is the same on high quality as low, 
then the seller can do better by cheating, so long as higher 
quality entails higher costs. It appears that a seller of a 
high quality experience good will require a premium over the 
normal competitive price. See the next paragraph in the 
text and the references cited there. 
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forces that act to eliminate any gap between price and 
marginal cost and competitive forces that lead producers to 
pr:-0vide any and all qualities, so long as buyers ue willing to 
pay for their additional costs. 
Common observation suggests that reputation usually 
works well in natural markets for frequently purchased 
experience goods. It seems likely that the potential conflicts 
sketched above are somehow overcome. Work by Klein & 
Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (198:2a,b, 1983) showed how profit-
maximizing sellers could have incentives to provide a range 
of quality in experience good markets. Two conditions are 
required: a higher margin of profit on higher quality items,6 
and an unwillingness on the part of buyers to trust a seller 
with whom they have had no prior experience unless the 
seller binds himself to lose money if he cheats. The first is 
necessary to ensure that the cheater has something to lose; 
the second to prevent the continual selling of low quality 
items at high prices by "new" firms. 
The first condition can be achieved through a price 
premium. There is a price "premium" for a high quality item, 
such that a seller would make as much profit by supplying 
the high quality item in the indefinite future than he would 
by cheating once and being forced to sell low quality items 
thereafter. A prke reflecting such a premium is known as a 
"quality assuring" price. The premium will be larger, the 
larger the difference in the costs of supplying high and low 
5 This does not necesarily imply that sellers' of high 
quality items earn higher rates of return on their investment 
than other sellers. The for mer may have to may have to 
invest more than the latter to build their reputations. Their 
higher margin of profit per unit sold is thus a return for 
their higher initial investment. For further discussion, see 
below. 
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qualities, the lower the repurchase rate and the more 
"forgiving" buyers are.'6 
A perfectly unforgiving buyer is one who will never 
again be willing to pay a seller a high price if the seller has 
ever delivered a low <1uality item at a high price. A 
forgiving buyer is one who is sometimes willing to gamble on 
paying a high price, even though that seller has in the past 
provided low quality at high pric~s. in the hopes that this 
time the seller will deliver high quality. The more forgiving 
buyers are, the more profitable a cheating strategy becomes 
and therefore the larger the premium required to assure high 
quality. Competition may force this premium to the minimum 
point, where sellers are just indifferent between cheating and 
continuing to provide high quality, but it cannot completely 
eliminate it. 
The second condition can be met if buyers will only 
trust sellers who invest in assets that will be rendered 
worthless if they cheat. Firms can do this either by 
providing high quality units at low "introductory" prices 
(Shapiro), or by "bonding" themselves by investing in highly 
firm or brand name specific assets7 that will become 
worthless if they ruin their reputation (Klein and Leffler). 
6 We use the term "f or.givcness" in the sense used by 
Axelrod ( 1984, 36). 
1 Klein & Leffler (p. 626) ref er to these as "non-
salvageable" assets and cite investments in the "design of a 
firm logo or an expensive sign promoting the firm's name" as 
examples. In their formal model, they assume that buyers 
know both the production costs of different qualities and the 
value of non-salvageable assets. Later (629-633), they 
discuss the possible . role of conspicuous expenditures on 
advertising as a signal to buyers who do not know the 
precise underlying costs. In the experiments, buyers knew 
nothing about sellers costs and advertising was not costly. 
Only Shapiro's mode of satisfying the second condition 
was available in the experiments. Shapiro's model does not 
require buyers to know seller's costs. 
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In both models, buyer ignorance of quality before 
purchase r~sults in some inefficiency relative to the perfect 
information case, that is, buyer ignorance entails real costs. 
In Shapiro's (1982) model, sellers will choose to produce 
lower quality than they would if buyers were fully informed. 
In Klein and Leffler's model, not only is price above marginal 
cost, entailing some loss of efficiency, but the "bonding" 
assets themselves must be (at least in part) nonproductive 
because they must have no resale value if the firm ruins its 
reputation. Thus, the use of r~putation to assure quality in 
experience goods markets is not costless. Public policies 
designed to increase consumer information may therefore 
increase the efficiency with which such markets operate, 
even though such public policies entail real costs of their 
own. 
In the experiments described here, we examined a pure 
"experience" good purchased frequently. We did this because 
experience '800ds are simpler to model and they have been 
more intensively studied than goods with hidden 
characteristics and yet, as we have seen, the process of 
reputation development in such markets could be quite 
complex. The more general class of goods with "hidden" 
characteristics is almost surely more important for consumer 
protection policy, but behavior in experiments with hidden 
characteristics is likely to be difficult to interpret. People 
often appear to use (possibly different) "heuristic" rules to 
assess the liklihood of an uncertain event (Kahneman, Slovic, 
Tversky, 1982).8 Little is presently known as to how people 
formulate such rules and consequently little formal modeling 
of markets for products with hidden characteristics has been 
done. It seemed best to begin with the simpler and better 
8 There have been several experiments which investigate 
how markets perform when the goods traded have hidden 
characteristics. There are briefly reviewed in Appendix III. 
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formulated case of experience goods subject to frequent 
repurcha'Se. 
Why Lemons? 
Why investigate the "lemons" problem? Two reasons. 
First the "lemons" problem, bad quality drives out good, and 
the related problem of the lack of close correlation between 
price and quality, is of direct interest to the FTC. Second, 
in virtually all the instances in which it has arisen, the 
debate has centered on whether the "lemons" problem is real 
and, if so, what evidence would be required to show it. 
Third, the "lemons" problem is perhaps the simplest case of 
informational market failure that has been extensively 
analyzed by economists. 
The "lemons" probkm, even in its most literal form, is 
of direct interest to the FTC, Part of the controversy 
concerning the FTC's recently issued Used Car Rule was a 
debate over whether there was evidence of a substantial 
lemons problem in this market.9 Those who thought there 
was little or no evidence of a problem pointed to the 
-incentives dealers have to maintain their reputations and tc 
their ability to provide warranties to effectively signal high 
quality. Those on the other side suggested that neithet 
reputations nor warranties were sufficient to produce ar 
efficient market and so mandated disclosure would improve 
market performance. 
Another recent FTC case involving a homebuilder (War< 
Homes) led to an explicit debate over whether housin: 
quality is adequately signaled to the market by the builder' 
reputation and by the warranty offered or whether th 
market exhibits a "lemons" problem because builders cannc 
effectively "commit" themselves to high quality performance. 
9 See the original staff report of 1978 and the indust1 
response to it. For a better appreciation of the difficulty < 
assessing the evidence, see the careful empirical study t 
Lacko ( 1986 ). 
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Both the (I 979) FTC Staff Report -0n Life Insurance Cost 
Disdosure and the (1985) FTC Staff Report On Life Insurance 
Products and Consumer Information made extensive use of an 
analogy to the "lemons" model in an attempt to understand 
how the the life insurance industry operates. One of the 
arguments made was that since consumers could not evaluate 
the "price" of different policies (even after the sale), a lower 
price did not make it easier to sell a policy. Sales depend 
more on the selling talent of the salesman than on the 
objective qualities of the product. Companies compete for 
good salesmen by offering high sales commissions. High cost 
policies may, therefore, drive out low, and this would explain 
the market success of some policies that appeared to provide 
less than competitive rates of return on life insurance 
savings. There was, however, disagreement (even among 
Commission staff)10 as to whether any "lemons" problem 
existed in this market. Critics of the reports pointed to the 
large number of life insurance companies and agents and the 
ease with which new companies enter the business, and 
suggested it is very unlikely that firms could successfully 
off er policyholders less than going market rates of return. 
They argued that the low measured rates of return must 
therefore fail to reflect some benefits attainable through 
certain types of life insurance contracts (e.g., certain 
options) that are not available through other savings 
alternatives. 
Thus, "lemons" problems are of direct relevance to the 
FTC. Moreover, Akerlof's original paper (1970) was followed 
by a substantial amount of discussion and work on similar 
problems both by economists and policymakers. 
It is important to establish that a lemons problem can 
really occur before examining alternative institutions that 
might correct it. What are the general conditions under 
which lemons problems arise? Akerlof's and later work 
10 See the introduction and chapters VII and VIII rn the 
1985 Report. 
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sugges-ts two aspects ar~ important: first, that consumers 
cannot easily and <:heaply learn the quality of the product 
prior to sale and second, that future sales depend little on 
past performan<:e. Thus the root cause of failure in 
Akerlof's model is the combination of an experience good 
with a zero repurchase rate in the future, regardless of 
customer sa ti sf action. 
In the experiments, we captured the lack of an incentive 
to build a r~putation by making it impossible for buyers to 
learn the identity of sellers, that is, sellers had no brand 
names. Sellers thus had no economic reason to try to 
develop reputations. In the experiments, the 'Condition "no 
brand names" ought to lead to an all lemons equilibrium 
whether or not sellers can make claims. 
If it does occur, what cures are available for Akerlof's 
disease? External regulations might cure the lemons problem; 
in fact, any of the general types enforced by the FTC might 
work. A rule against deceptive a-Overtising might work, if 
higher than average quality sellers make claims and if buyers 
assume that those sellers who make no claims are low 
quality. If sellers avoid making any claims, mandatory 
disclosure could cure the problem. Post-purchase remedies, 
such as a voluntary warranty with terms enforced by the 
FTC or a required warranty specifying a minimum level of 
quality, could also solve the problem. But, as discussed 
above, regulations themselves are costly, quality and the 
truthfulness of claims may be very difficult to specify 
precisely and regulatory r~sour<:es are limited. So it is 
sensible to ask, "Under what conditions will normal market 
forces themselves be sufficient to overcome a lemons 
problem?" 
Why Experiments? 
Experimental markets have several advantages compared 
to naturally occurring markets. Natural markets arc so 
complex that it is extremely difficult to determine if there is 
a lemons or adverse selection problem in a particular market. 
An experiment can be designed so there is no doubt that 
every buyer values a high quality item more than a low one 
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and, in similar circumstances, by exactly the same amount; 
that all high quality units are e~actly alike as are all low 
quality uni{s; that every buy~r values the extra quality more 
than the extra c-0st and that there are no subtk 
"transactions" costs (for example, a particular buyer may be 
more costly to deal with, a particular seller may ·char.ge a 
higher price but provide better credit terms or faster 
delivery, etc.). In short, the experimental setting allows us 
to eliminate much -Of complex diversity in natural markets 
that lead to seemingly endless arguments over whether or not 
there is any substantial evidence of market failure. If 
reasonable people cannot even agree on whether a given 
market exhibits massive inefficiency or no inefficiency, there 
seems little chance of gathering persuasive evidence of the 
causes of market failure. By contrast, experimental controls 
allow us to predsely measure actual market efficiency and so 
make it possible to study the effects of different regimes or 
rules on overall market performance. We can focus on the 
important, but difficult questions of when, how and why 
sellers dealing with uninformed buyers seek to develop "good" 
reputations. 
While the ability to control many features of the 
experimental environment has great and obvious advantages, 
the main disadvantage is that in any single experiment you 
can no longer be sure that you have actually captured the 
most important features of the natural markets of interest. 
The Experiments 
We will now provide a brief account of how the 
experime.nts were conducted. 
Buyer and seller values for both low quality items 
(called "regulars") and high quality it.ems (called "supers") 
were "induced" by the experimenter. For example, a buyer 
might be told that the experimenter would pay $3.30 for the 
first "super" purchased, but only Sl.80 for the first "regular" 
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purchasetl. 11 Sellers might be told that they coultl purchase 
"supers" at $1.65 per unit and "regulars" at $.65 per unit. If 
a buyer and seller agreed to an exchange at. say. $3 and the 
unit supplied was a "super", then the buyer woultl sell the 
unit to the experimenter for $3.30 and so net 30 cents 
"profit" on the transaction. The seller would keep the 
difference between what the buyer paid ($3) and the "cost" 
of the unit ($ 1.65) for a net profit of $1.35. The 
experimenter would pay out a total of $1.65 to buyer and 
seller. 
Note that if the seller provided a "regular" at a price 
of $3, his profit would increase by $1 to $2.35. The buyer, 
however, would lose $1.50. or 50 'Cents more than the seller 
gains, since he could only resell his $3 regular for $1.80. 
The experimenter would pay $1.80 to the buyer and would 
collect $.65 from the seller for a net cost of $1.15. The sale 
of a regular is "inefficient" in this case, because the buyer 
and seller jointly could have made more money from the 
experiment if a super had been exchanged. The experimental 
design ensured that it would always be more efficient, in this 
sense, to exchange supers. · 
In all the experiments, buyers and sellers were kc.pt in 
separate rooms. Bids and offers were communicated by CB 
radio and recorded on a blackboard visible to all in a given 
room. In some experiments sellers were not identified in any 
way. We ref er to this condition as "brand names prohibit·ed." 
In other experiments, seller offers were accompanied by 
the seller's identity number. In this way, buyers could 
return to the same seller, if they desired. We ref er to this 
condition as "brand names permitted." 
11 Not the actual values used. In the experiments, 
prices wer.e quot.ed in an artificial currency called "francs". 
Buyers and sellers were usually subject to different (but 
known before the experiment began) conversion rates from 
"francs" into dollars. Subjects were paid in dollars, however, 
at the end of each experiment. 
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During 'Some experiments, sellers were permitted to 
make a claim about the quality of the item they were 
offering at a given price. For example, the message might 
be "seller number 5 offers a super at $3." We r<:f er to this 
condition as "advertising allowed." 
In some experiments, sellers were allowed to make false 
claims and in -0tbers, claims, if made, had to be truthful. 
In general, buyers learned the actual quality delivered 
only after the sale. In some cases, the actual quality 
delivered by each seller was made "public" by posting it on 
the blackboard. In oth<:r cases, only the purchaser knew the 
true quality deliv,{!red. 
Results 
A crude but simple summary of the complex results of 
21 experiments is shown in the array on the following page. 
(Warning: The actual experiments involved many more 
variations than displayed here. A full account of the 
conditions is given in Table I, section II. The results are 
summarized fully in Tables II-IV, section IV.) A 
"dictionary" is provided to show briefly how an aspect of 
interest occurring in natural markets was translated into 
operational terms in the experimental markets. 
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SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
No Brand 
Names 
Advertising 
Prohibit.ed 
Lemons 
Brand Names Mixed:Lemons 
Allowed in Two Subject 
Advertising 
Allowed But 
Can Be False 
Not Tested 
Lemons 
But CIT 
Advertising 
Allowed But 
Must Be True 
Efficient 
Effici·ent 
(Reputation Pools But Fairly Subjects 
possible) Efficient In Not T.ested 
CIT Pool 
Natural Market 
"Brand Name" 
"Advertising" 
DICTIONARY 
Experimental Market 
Seller Identity is Known 
Seller May Specify That He 
Will Deliver a "Super" or a 
"Regular" 
Note: "labeling" and offering a warranty arc equivalent to 
"advertising" in these experiments. Advertising was costles! 
to sellers. CIT refers to the California Institute of 
Technology. 
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Without brand names -Or advertising, our experimental 
markets produce virtually all lemons. Neither altruism n-0r 
any strategic complexity. prevent the lemons model from 
accurately pnx:Hcting the price and quality distributions 
observed in the experiments. This is the first .dear 
demonstration of the existence of the J.emons phenomenon 
that we know of. 
In all cases, requiring that any claims made be truthful, 
qui~kly produoes markets that behave almost perfectly 
efficiently. 
The opportunity and incentive to build a reputation is 
not sufficient to cure the lemons problem in the simple 
experience goods market we set up. The -commonsense notion 
that reputation will work well if sellers depend on repeat 
sales was not supported. 
It was possible to build reputation in the experimental 
markets when "brand names" or the identity of the seller was 
known to the buyers. With "advertising" or labeling 
prohibited, results were mixed. In two of the subject pools 
(students from Boston University & Pasadena City College) 
market performan~e did not significantly differ from that 
observed when reputation was impossible to build, that is, 
these were essentially "lemons" markets. In the third subject 
pool (students from the California Institute of Technology or 
"CIT"), market performance was substantially more efficient 
when brand names were allowed, but still fell short of the 
efficiencies obtained when only truthful claims were allowed. 
When possibly false advertising or labeling was 
permitted along with brand names, all the observed markets 
were essentially "lemons", but the CIT subjects were not 
tested under this condition. Hen~e the addition of 
advertising or labeling to brand name made no apparent 
difference. Since the "advertising" was not costly, economic 
theory predicts that it could not be effe.ctively used as a 
"signal" of high quality. Therefore the results should not be 
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significantly differ<!nt from the brand names but n{) 
advertising <:ondition just dis<:ussed and they were not. 
Why did the common >Sense notion and some of the 
explicit economic models of reputation prove to be poor 
pr,edictors of the behavior observed in the ,experimental 
markets? There are two broad possibilities: the implicit or 
explicit assumptions concerning buyer and seller behavior 
used in the models were violated by the subjects in the 
experimental markets and/or the experimental design failed to 
capture some elements of natural markets and theoretical 
models that ue crucial to determining the way buyers and 
sellers behave in natural markets. 
In the experimental markets, buyers did not behave in 
the simple "unforgiving" or "rewarding" way the theoretical 
models presuppo~e. Buyers did not always punish sellers for 
delivering low quality at a high price by refusing ever to pay 
a high price again, nor did they always reward a delivery of 
high quality at a low price by a willingness to deal again 
with the same seller at a higher price. Thus far, buyer 
behavior in these experiments resists any simple description. 
The development of seller reputation in the experimental 
markets is also sometimes subject to "spill-overs," which are 
not taken into account in the models. In some of the 
experiments, if one seller cheated (provided low quality at a 
high price), he seemed to adversely affect the reputations of 
all sellers. Observing "one bad apple" led some buyers to 
conclude that all sellers were rotten. The se<:ond "spill-over" 
observed in some experiments was that sellers could, to some 
extent, "free ride" on the good reputation built by another 
seller. This free riding can be a source of inefficiency, 
because anticipatory price cutting by· the late-comers may 
make it appear unprofitable for anyone to invest rn 
developing a reputation in the first place. 
The design of the experimental markets reported here 
omitted several aspects of natural markets that might have a 
substantial effect on reputation development and that alsc 
precluded a sharp test of the "quality assuring" price 
prediction. 
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Each seller was limited t'O the sak of at most two units 
in each .period. This implies that sellers cannot greatly 
increase their market shares by developing good reputations, 
and so buyers can not use market shares as a signal of qual-
ity. In conjunction with the way buyers' incentives were 
structured, it also means that seliers earn "rents." The full 
information perfectly competitive price will be above the cost 
at which the seBers obtain the units. Hence it is difficult to 
detect whether the off er of a "premium" over cost for high 
quality would in fact lead to the provision of more high 
quality units. Note also that since buyers are ignorant of 
the extra cost of high quality, it is difficult for them to 
assess how large a p,remium they may have to pay for 
assurance of high quality. 
Some later experiments were run (see Miller and Plott, 
1985) with the quantity limitation on sellers removed. For 
the same subject pools, this resulted in more efficient market 
performance than that reported here. Markets were not 
perfectly efficient, but developed into two segments. The 
low price segment provided low quality at the competitive 
price, while the high price segment generally provided high 
quality items at prices that exceeded the difference in the 
.cost of providing the two qualities. Thus the ability to 
increase market share in an experience good market is 
associated with greater efficiency and price "premia" do seem 
to result in a greater frequency of high quality deliveries. 
Reputation alone, however, even when market shares can 
increase, does not completely eliminate "lemons". 
A second aspect of natural markets not present in the 
experimental markets is the ·fact that advertising is costly. 
Thus the theory that costly advertising may act as signal of 
high quality could not be tested in these experiments. This 
remains an important question for further research. 
A third discrepency between the experimental and 
natural markets that may account for the failure of 
reputation to eliminate indfkiency is the short business 
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horizon of the sellers. While the subjects were unaware of 
the exact time at which the experiment would end. they were 
told that the. experiments would run for about 3 hours. Thus 
sellers in the experimental markets had very short "horizons" 
compared to sellers in natural markets, since the latter have 
the possbility of selling their brand name (and its reputation) 
to someone else. Not only would such sellers have more 
incentive to cheat, but according to some theorists, a finite 
horizon implies that rational sellers will always cheat, that 
buyen will anticipate this cheating and so a lemons market 
will result. 12 The findings for the CIT subjects are 
inconsistent with this theory, but the theory is consistent 
with the results for the other subject pools. In any case, 
the short horizon may well have had an effect on the 
observed results. Additional experiments are needed to 
determine just how important that effect might be. 
We should also note that some of the f~atur·es of the 
experimental market were designed to be extreme rather than 
representative of natural markets. For example. the cost of 
the high quality item was fives times higher than the cost of 
the low quality in most of our markets. This high ratio was 
· .expressly chosen to provide sellers with ample incentive to 
cheat. Lower ratios do result in more efficient markets (see 
conclusion 13, chapter IV). Our experimental markets were 
not designed to emulate any particular natural market, but to 
study reputation formation under simple and sometimes 
extreme conditions. Therefore, the results should not be 
taken as representative of those that would obtain in natural 
markets. 
12 See Luce and Raiffa (1957) for a thorough discussion 
of a closely related situation that occurs in repeated plays of 
a "prisoner's dilemma" game. Selten's "chain store paradox" 
is also similar; recent attempts to resolve it include Kreps 
and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982). Axelrod 
(1984) provides a very interesting discussion of repeated 
prisoner dilemma games, as played by computer programs. 
animals and politicians. He thoroughly explores the 
sometimes surprising success of the simple strategy of "ti1 
for tat." 
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In short. we have demonstrat~ that "lemons" markets 
occur under precisely those conditions spedfied by economic 
theory and that truthful advertising imposed by a third party 
produces or restores efficiency. The "common sense" notion 
that the incentive sellers have to make future sales is 
sufficient, by itself, to force sellers to develop good 
reputations and thereby over~ome any "lemons" problem was 
not supported by the simple experiments. Successful 
reputation development may require longer horizons than 
were possible in the experiments, or some way of "bonding" 
performance such as through costly advertising. In any case, 
our experiments suggest that frequent repurchase alone is not 
sufficient. The development and functioning of reputation as 
a means of assuring efficency in markets with imperfect 
information, in spite of its obvious importance, is still poorly 
understood. 
\ 
! 
CHAPTER 11 
THE MARKET AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENTS, 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN, AND PROCEDURES 
Parameters 
A total of twenty-one markets were conducted plus 
some pilot experiments. Participants were students at Boston 
University (BU), California Institute of Technology (Cahech), 
and Pasadena City College (PCC). Some of these participants 
were involved in several markets as a control for 
experience. 
All markets proceeded as a series of market days or 
trading periods. The number of periods was unknown to 
participants, but, because they knew roughly the maximum 
time of the experiment (three hours), they had some idea of 
when the last periods were approaching. Sellers r<:mained 
sellers throughout an experiment and buyers remained 
buyers. 
Sellers could supply units of grade Super or Regular. 
Each seller was limited. to a total supply of two units per 
period. The units could be any combination of grades 
possible as long as each seller supplied a total of two or less 
units. Thus, the seller could sell two Rs, two Ss, one of 
each, one unit of some type, or nothing. The fact that 
Supers were more costly to sellers than were Regulars was 
public information. Both Supers and Regulars were supplied 
at constant marginal cost up to the limit of two units in 
total. For "high cost" experiments, which are all but 
selected periods of experiments 19 and 21, the (constant) 
marginal cost of Supers was 100 francs (one dollar) more 
than the (constant) marginal cost of Regulars. In the 
low-cost experiments, this difference in marginal cost wa~ 
reduced to either 20 or 25 francs. 
25 
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Buyers' redemption value of Supers was more than 
Regulars and this was public information. The redemption 
value for buyers is in Figure J. As can be seen, the 
marginal valuation of a Super always dominates the marginal 
valuation of a Regular. Thus, given a choice of a Super or 
Regular, a buyer would always prefer a Super until a limit of 
three Supers is attained and the marginal valuation falls to 
zero. All buyers had identical redemption schedules. 
For a typical experiment with eight buyers and six 
sellers the market demand and supply are presented in Figure 
J. The values are in an experimental currency called 
"francs" that have a dollar conversion factor. As can be 
seen, the market supply is horizontal for twelve units and 
then becomes vertical. 
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All transactions were in an experimental medium of 
exchange called francs. Francs could be converted to dollars 
at a predetermined rate known only to each individual. Prior 
to some markets, subjects were told that the dollar per franc 
conversion rate might be scaled upward after the 
experiment. In early experiments in which little was known 
about behavior and parameters, the value of francs was 
increased so that on average participants earned about $5 to 
$7 per hour. This was thought necessary in order that the 
experienced subjects would be willing to participate again. 
In addition to profits earned from purchases and sales, 
buyers were given a bonus of 50 francs each period and an 
unexpected one-time endowment of 200 francs at the end of 
the first period. Early pilot experiments demonstrated a 
potential problem of credibility and control, which the bonus 
helped to eliminate. During the first period inexperienced 
buyers would pay high prices for units on the expectation 
that seHers would deliver Supers. When Regulars were 
actually delivered, the buyers suffered substantial losses. 
Once operating at a loss, they seemed to suspect that the 
experimenter would not collect money from the subjects, so 
they had little to lose from further losses. With perceived 
downside risk gone, control over incentives was lost. The 
surprise bonus was sufficient to bring all buyers back to a 
profitable position. When the surprise bonus was given to 
buyers, they were told to expect no more bonuses. Of 
course we had no real 'Control over expectations, so we were 
potentially trading one problem for another. 
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Market and Re.gulatory Variables 
Institutional variables were those that deal with market 
organization, information, and the rights and guarantees 
afforded to participants. The institutional variables are the 
treatment variables. When and how did the grade of a unit 
become known to a buyer? What guarantees were available 
to buyers of Regulars who thought they were buying Supers? 
When and how did the "Sales record of individual sellers 
become known? Answers to the"Se questions define the 
institutional structure of the markets. These institutional 
f eature"S will be discussed after the features common to all 
markets are outlined. 
1. The Basic Market Organization 
The basic market organization was the same for all 
markets. Buyers and sellers were located in different 
rooms. Communication betwee·n rooms was a<=complished by 
citizen band (CB) radios. Each room had an experimenter in 
front of the room equipped with a large chalkboard and a CB 
radio. A long horizontal line scaled from zero to infinity 
francs was displayed on the chalkboard. Buyers submitted 
bids that were transmitt-ed to the seller room over the CB by 
the experimenter. At the same time the experimenter in the 
buyer room entered the bid under the horizontal line at the 
franc value equal to the bid. When the bid transmission was 
received in the seller room, the experimenter repeated the 
bid and entered it under the horizontal line at the 
appropriate value. Similarly, when sellers tendered offers, 
the off er was entered above the line at the appropriate value 
and transmitted to the buyer room where it was verbally 
repeated and entered on the chalkboard. If two bids (offers) 
were tendered at the same price, the second one was listed 
below (above) the first one. Thus the time of tender is 
partially ordinally indexed by distance from the line. 
Bids and offers remained open until a1:cepted or 
canceled. Buyers or sellers accepted offers/bids verbally b'.) 
indicating to the experimenter the one they wanted frorr 
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th·ose on the chalkboard. Traders were free to indicate the 
particular bid or offer they wanted independent of the 
temporal order of tender. An acceptance was immediately 
·radioed to the other side of the market over the CB. Of 
c-0urse, since the CB transmitter and receiver were located in 
the room with agents, all transmissi-0ns over the radio were 
public. Once a trade was made the bid/offer was circled on 
the chalkboards and numbered. Aside from bids, offers, 
acceptances, and other necessary communications with 
experimenters, the participants were not allowed to say 
anything. No talking was permitted. 
2. Regulatory En¥ironment 
The major tr·eatment variables were warranties, warranty 
enforcement, identification of the seller of units, and the 
timing and public or private nature of grade revelation. 
These variables are discussed in order. 
Warranties, when they existed, were express warranties 
generated by a claim or grade advertisement by the seller 
prior to the buyer's purchase. 13 In some cases sellers and 
buy.ers could do nothing other than make bids and offers 
with no reference at all to the grade of the unit. This 
condition is designated as "N" because no warranties of any 
sort existed or could exist. Under a different condition, 
condition "O," sellers had the option of advertising a unit as 
a Re.gular or Super at the time an off er was tendered to the 
market. The off er was the.n tagged on the chalkboard as an 
S -0r R according to the seller advertisement. Likewise, 
13 Section 2-313 of the uniform commercial code 
requires: (a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the 
;eller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes 
Jart of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty 
hat the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise. 
b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the 
>asis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the 
:oods shall conf orrn to the description. 
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under the "0" condition buyers had the option of indkating 
along with a bid the .grade of the unit desired. A third 
{;Ondition, "R," required sellers to advertise or disclose units 
as either a Regular or a Super at the time of an offer and 
required buyers to indicate with all bids, the grade of the 
unit desired. Thus, the re.gulatory environment governing 
warranties ~ould be any of the conditions (N,0,R). 
Warranties could be unenforceable (condition U) or 
enforceable (condition E). If warranties were unenforceable, 
no regulations existed governing the cases in which sellers 
failed to deliver the grade that was promised in the 
advertisement or r,equested by the buyer. That is, sellers 
could adv·ertise a unit as a Super but deliver a Regular and 
the buyer could do nothing about it. In .essence, false 
advertising was peqnitted. If warranties were enforceable 
(condition E) buyers were granted "specific performance."14 
That is, the seller was required to deliver a Super to the 
buyer if the unit had been so adv.ertised. Thus, the 
enforcement condition could take two values (U,E). 
In some markets sellers' identification numbers 
accompanied all offers and bids transmitted over the CB. 
Furthermore, under such ·conditions buyers were able to 
direct bids to individual sellers and such tagged bids could 
14 Consistency of this regulation with the uniform 
commercial code is covered in Section 2-716. ( 1) Specific 
performance may be decreed where the goods are unique or 
in other proper circumstances. (2) The decree for specific 
performance may include such terms and conditions as to 
payment of the price, damages, or otlier relief as the court 
may deem just. (3) The buyer has a right of replevin for 
goods identified to the contract if after reasonable effort he 
is unable to effect cover for such goods or the circumstances 
reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing or if 
the goods have been shipped under reservation and 
satisfaction of the security interest in them has been made 
or tendered. 
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only be 3'Ccepted by the requested sclk:rs. This ,condition is 
-Oesignated as K t-0 indicue that sellers' (but not buyers') 
identifications were known at the time of a contract. In the 
alternative condition U, neither buyer nor seller ever knew 
the identity of a trading partner. Thus, the identiftcation 
variable took two values (U,K). 
Unless grades were covered by an enforced express 
warranty, buyers became aware of grade either immediately 
after the purchase (condition A) or at the end of a period 
(condition E). Under condition A the seller held up a card 
immediately after the sale with letter S or R indicating the 
unit as Super or Regular. The information was then 
transmitted by the experimenter to the buyer. Under 
'Condition E the seller would submit a slip of paper indicating 
the grade for each trade in which the seHer was involved. 
Trades were numbered on the chalkboard and sellers and 
buyers would record the number attached to each trade along 
with the price, etc. 
The case in which the enforced warranty is provided is 
a little hard to describe notationally. If a grade was 
advertised, which need not be the case under condition "O," 
the buyer was aware of the grade prior to purchase. Thus 
the notation B is used. The actual announcement, however, 
could have been "A" or "E." 
Some int~rpretations are in order. An enforce<i 
warranty can be interpreted as a case m whi:ch all 
characteristics of the product can be fully identified and 
evaluated by the customer prior to purchase. If the grade 
becomes known immediately after the sale, the customer has 
no recourse from unfulfilled expectations except alterations 
in future purchase patterns. Since the information becomes 
available immediately after a purchase, the consumer can 
rea<:t through modifications of purchasing behavior for the 
remainder of the period as can other buyers if the 
information is public. If the information becomes available 
only at the end of a period, the consumer is faced with a 
type of "credence" problem. During a period the consumers 
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are unable to evaluate purchases. The information that 
permits evaluation becomes available only after a delay. 
Information about ~rade was either publicly revealed 
(condition Pub.) or privately revealed (condition Pvt.). In 
the case of public revelation the information regarding grade 
communicated to the experimenter was then announced over 
the CB for all to hear including the buyer. If the 
information was privately revealed, the slip indicating grade 
was passed along to the buyer or a cipher was used to 
privately transmit the grade over the CB. The latter 
procedure was useful if the rooms were so far apart that 
physical delivery of slips slowed the process excessively. 
Experimental Design 
A total of twenty-one markets was studied. The 
treatment variables induded experience on the part of buyers 
and sellers, the relative cost of Supers, and the regulator~ 
variables listed above. Obviously, with the large number ol 
potential treatment variables not all possible experiment: 
could be conducted. The strategy was to follow the 
sequential process outlined in the introductory statements 
The choice of a particuiar experiment depended in part upor 
the availability of subjects and the pattern of previou 
results. 
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The treatments <:hosen for ea<:h of the twenty-one 
markets are listed in Table I. The conditions of an 
experiment are indicated by an 8-tuple. 
2 3 4 
Warranty Warranty Trader Time of Grade 
Offered Enforcement l.D.'s Revelation 
(N,R,0) (U,E) (U,K) (B,A,E) 
5 6 7 8 
Method of Grade Experience Relative Location 
Rev,elation Super Cost 
(Pub,Pvt) (N,E,VE) (L,H) (BU,CIT,PCC) 
For example, the index (0,E,U,B,Pub,VE,H,PCC) is a market 
in which warranties were optional but enforced if provided; 
trader I.D.'s were unknown; grades were known before 
purchase because warranties were enforced; the grades were 
publicly announced; traders were very experienced; the cost 
of Supers was in the relatively high condition; and the 
experiment was conducted at Pasadena City College. 
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Subjects with no expcri<:n'Ce (N) had participated in no 
experiments of the type under examination here, but some 
subjects from Caltech had participated in market experiments 
of a different type and were thus somewhat familiar with a 
market experimental environment. Experienced (E), subjects 
had participated in at least one previous experiment in this 
series. In almost all cases of new subjects the first market 
experience involved at least two different treatment variables 
that resulted in different patterns of market price so that 
afterwards subjects were all somewhat familiar with aspects 
of the parameters. Very experienced subjects (VE) had 
participated in at least two previous experiments. 
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Table 1 
A LIST OF CONDmONS, SUBJECT POOLS AND 
PARAMETERS USED IN ALL EXPERIMENTS 
Key to Abbreviations 
Column 3 Column 4 Columns 
N - DO E •yes U • unknown 
R • required U •DO K •known 
0 - optional 
2 3 4 5 6 i 8 
lnlonnatlOll 
Grade Grack about Gradr 
Exp. v;arranry Wunnty SelJrr• Subject 
No. Locaoon Rlqunmea1 ~ ldenlifiallOn r1111e Mrtbod ~
BU N u 1-6 .[ pvt N 
K 7,8 
2 BU N u E pvt N 
3 BU R 1-6 E u B pub N 
N 7-9 u E JJ'"t 
4 BU R 9-8 E u B pub N 
N 9.11 u E JJ'"t 
5 BU N K E pub N 
6 Bl: N K E pub E 
7 Bl: N K E pub E 
8 err N 1-6.9.10 u E pvt N 
R 7.8 E u B pub 
9 PCe N 1·8 u E P"'t N 
R 9-11 u B pub 
10 Pee N 1-6 K E pub N 
0 7.8 E K B pub 
11 err N K 1-8 E pub 1-8 8-E 
u 9-10 pvt 9.10 6-N 
12 PCC N J-6 K A pub N 
0 7 E 
13 PCC N 1-6 K A pub N 
0 7 E A pub 
14 Pee N 1·7 K A pub N 
0 8.9 u K 
5-VE 
lS err N K E P"'t 6-E 
3-N 
16 PCe N 1-7 K A pub E 
0 8.9 E 
3-VE 
Ji Pee N 1-8 K A pub 8-E 
R 9 E 2-N 
N 1-6 5-VE 
18 PCC 0 7.8.9 u K A pub 9-E 
R 10.11 E 
19 Pee N 1·3 K A pub 2-VE 
0 4·14 t 5-E 
3) err N K E JJ''t N 
21 PCC N K A pub VE 
. Buyer ldrnlifiabOlll werr always unknown excepc penodl 7 and 8 ol expenment 1 . 
fas' ~7 DESIGN 
Key to Ahbreviatiam 
Column 6 Column 7 Column 8 
B • before purchase JIUb • public N • D11De 
A • after purcbae pvt • private E • aperienoed 
E • period end VE • YetJ expeJienced 
. 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
F u11 lnformaOon 
Cost Nwnber 
CompetilM 
Equilibrium Price•• Total 
Eqi. Nwnber 
No. Supers Rel\llars 8uyen Sellen Supers Replars Periods 
13> 3) 7 6 300 165 8 
2 13> 3) 7 6 300 165 7 
3 13> 3) s 4 300 165 9 
4 13> 3) 8 6 300 165 11 
s 13> 3) 8 6 300 165 7 
6 125 25 8 6 305 170 12 
7 HS 25 8 6 305 170 12 
8 13> 3) 6 6 300 165 10 
9 13> 3) 7 6 300 165 11 
10 13> 3) 8 6 300 165 8 
11 13> 3) 8 6 300 165 10 
12 13> 3) 8 6 300 165 -
' 
13 13> 3) 8 6 300 165 7 
14 13> 3) 8 6 300 165 9 
15 13> 20 8 6 305 170 10 
16 120 3) 8 6 305 170 9 
17 120 20 7 6 305 170 9 
18 13> 20 8 6 305 170 11 
19 120 3) 5 1(6) ... 300 165 14 (7-14)4() 3) 
20 13> 3) 8 6 300 i65 9 
125 25 
21 (5.14)45 20 8 6 305 170 14 
•• SIF was .02 for buyers and .01 for selers. 8uyen receiYed SOF per period endowment 
plus a one-ame ~ payment ot ~ alter period 1. 
••• The IQOllOllCllist has the apacily al eilht sellers. 
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The description of the other varia-Oles must proceed 
with the discussion in the se<:tion above. The easiest way to 
und"erstand the variables is to n-0tke that advertising and the 
warranty are tied together in interpretation. If a grade is 
specified along with a bid or offer, it is viewed as both 
advertising and a warranty. The two are equivalent, because 
if a grade specification is available to any buyer, it is 
available to all. The interesting additional variable is 
whether or not the warranty is enforced or, equivalently, 
whether or not the advertising must necessarily be truthful. 
A "defective unit" backed by an unenforceable warranty is 
equivalent in these markets to an advertisement about grade 
that is false. As will be discussed in the parameter section 
below, the cost to sellers of delivering Supers was always 
higher than Regulars. If the difference was 100 francs ($1) 
per unit, the cost was in the high (H) condition. If the cost 
difference was 20 francs ($.20) or 25 fran<:s ($.25) per unit, 
the <:ondition was low (L). 
Experimental Procedures 
Subjects were recruited from BU undergraduate business 
and PCC undergraduate economics "classes and from Caltech 
dorms. The "sales pitch" included with the instructions in 
Appendix A contains the essence of the information given 
subjects when they were recruited. All were told that the 
experiment would take approximately three hours. They were 
told that we could not guarantee an amount, but that they 
would have an opportunity to make "more than they would 
likely make in a comparable hourly period," that "we have 
never had a dissatisfied customer," and that "we were 
interested in studying situations in which people make 
decisions that matter, so we provided incentives accordingly." 
Such statements were intended as assurances that the stakes 
could at least cover their opportunity cost. Of those that 
signed up at PCC, approximately 65 percent actually showed 
up. The rates were higher at BU and Caltech. 
At the assigned time and location the number of 
subjects present were counted and a decision was made about 
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the number -0f buyen and seUers.16 Subjects were randomly 
assigned instruction sheets as buyers or sellers. Buyers were 
on one side of the room and sellers were on the other side. 
Forms in the instructions were reproduced on the 
chalkboard. Instructions were then read. questions were 
answered. The market process was explained, in<:luding the 
bids and offers process. the chalkboard, and the 
determination of Supers and Regulars. If warranties or 
advertising were involved, special instructions regarding these 
were included.16 After all questions were answered, sellers 
were then a'Ccompanied to another room. 
When buyers and sellers were in separate rooms, 
questions were again answered. Buyers completed a period 
zero.17 They were also warned that they must keep accurate 
records and note the transaction· numbers. If we found 
anyone who "mistakenly" recorded Regulars as Supers, we 
would need to terminate the experiment.18 The market 
opened for period one and it remained open for seven 
minutes as opposed to the usual. five. After period one the 
extra bonus of 200 fran:cs was given to buyers in addition to 
the 50 franc per period endowment. Buyer and seller record 
sheets were checked after the first. second, and third periods 
and occasionally after that. 
15 We pref erred to have two more buyers than sellers. 
This would assure unique price predictions by certain models. 
16 See appendix I. 
17 See instructions. Each buyer was required to list 
the redemption values in the practice record sheet assuming 
a sequence of purchases SRRS in period I and RSR in period 
2. This exercise removed certain confusions about the 
redemption values. 
18 Fortunately the only cheating problems we detected 
were in the pilot experiments that caused us to add this 
statement. 
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MODELS AND IDEAS 
Ideas an-0 models are outlined in five different 
categories. We have applied the mod"els to generate a 
prediction, but the reader should notke that with all 'Of the 
ideas outlined in this section some latitude exists regarding 
how a model might best be applied to the markets we 
created. For example, some models found in the literature 
are supported by analysis that involves the reasoning process 
that agents undertake, what they observe, and how they 
process these observations. Since we did not have access to 
such data, theories that rest on such ideas remain untested. 
Instead we applied the models using those operational 
concepts and measurements that were available and seemed 
reasonable. 
The Full Information Model 
This idea rests on the hypothesis that the markets will 
behave as if all information about the underlying state of 
nature available to any agent will be revealed to all through 
the market process. A natural assumption would be that this 
model could only be applicable in cases where the buyer 
knows the seller, or some form of direct communication is 
possible. However, it is conceivable that the predictions of 
the model would be borne out even when such special 
conveniences are absent. Sequences of bids, special prices, 
special offers, etc. could all serve as some sort of signal. 
Any market is filled with such possibilities, so the model 
could generate good predications even in cases where buyers 
and sellers have far less than full information. 
The idea is as follows. Each seller presumably knows 
the·quality of a unit to be sold at the time an offer is 
40 
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t.endered.19 The state of nature is thus the pattern of 
Supers and Regulars offered on the market. The hypothesis 
is that buyers will behave as if they can distinguish between 
offers of Supers and Regulars. Sellers will develop a profit 
maximizing response to buyer decisions. Application of the 
laws of supply and demand yield a prediction that only 
Supers will b<: sold at a price of P8 (see Table 1 ). 
Null Expectations Model 
This idea rests on the hypothesis that buyers without 
prior instruction on the likelihood of Supers and Regulars 
will treat them as equally likely. The rational expectations 
postulate is not applied and neither is a substitute learning 
axiom. So expectations are postulated to be unchanging. 
Sellers will adopt a profit maximizing response to this .. 
behavior. If Supers and Regulars are expected to b<: equally 
likely, applrcation of the laws of supply yields a predietion 
that all Regulars will be sold at a price equal to the average 
of P8 and PR (see Table 1). 
Clearly a null expectations model could involve any 
probability at all. The choice of 50:50 is arbitrary. The 
model is used primarily as a point of r.ef erenc.e. 
Lemons Model 
Sellers, faced by buyers who behave as if they cannot 
distinguish Regulars from Supers, will adopt a short-term 
maximizing strategy and sell o.nly Regulars. Buyers seeing 
only Regulars delivered will develop rational expectations and 
behave as if they expect only Regulars. Application of the 
laws of supply and demand yidds predictions of all Regulars 
at a price PR (see Table l). 
19 In most markets the seller need not commit to a 
grade until after a sale. We assume, however, that the 
decision about gradeis made before an offer is tendered.· 
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Signaling Models 
If firms have a means ·of addin~ some distinguishable 
feature to units, that feature can sometimes be used as a 
signal that distinguishes offers of Supers from offers of 
Regulars. If the cost of adding this feature is sufficiently 
lower for Super units as opposed to the cost of adding the 
feature to Regular units, then signaling models predict a 
signaling equilibrium. The feature will be added to Supers 
only, and its presence will serve as a signal that lets buyers 
differentiate the underlying grades of units. See Spence 
( 1977), Rothschild and Stiglitz ( 1976), Miller and Plott ( 1985). 
Signaling models have an obvious application when 
warranty instruments exist. If warranties exist and are 
costlessly enforced, the cost of adding a warranty of Super 
to a Super unit is zero and the cost of adding a warranty of 
Super to Regular units is the difference between the cost of 
providing a Super and the cost of providing a Regular. The 
warranty guarantees specific performance, so a seller 
advertising a Super must deliver one and therefore loses the 
cost advantage of delivering a Regular. If warranties are 
required or are optional, then the signaling model becomes 
the full information model and therefore has the same 
predictions. The results will be volume that is all Super 
units sold with a warranty 20 and the price will be P'S (see 
Table I). 
A model developed by Grossman ( 1981) leads to the 
·same conclusions (Leland, 1981), but the Grossman model is 
based on different principles. Grossman applies a perfect 
20 Grossman (1981) develops the notion that the 
warranty will be added. His model differs from the signaling 
model, but in this narrow case the predictions are the same. 
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equilibria principle from game theory 21 and a rational 
expectations principle.22 
If warranties are not enforced, then the cost 
differential between adding the special feature to Supers and 
to Regulars disappears. Regulars can be advertised as 
Supers. The signaling model then predicts that no separation 
will occur because Super units and Regular units will both 
add the special feature. R-<:gular units will be offered along 
with an unenforceable warranty that the unit is a Super. 
Buyers will adopt expectations accordingly and anticipate that 
all units are regul~rs. The final r~ult will be all Regulars 
at a price of PR (see Table 1). 
The lemons model can also be interpreted as a 
degenerate case of the signaling model. In Akerlof's {1970) 
model, price serves the dual role of equilibrating supply and 
demand and signaling the quality of the product sold. 
Because of the one shot nature of trades and the absence of 
any cost associated with signaling high quality with high 
price, price cannot eff cctively signal quality and therefore 
only lemons are traded. 
Reputation Models 
Models of reputation formation tend to be motivated by 
the theory of dynamic games. Buyers behave as if they are 
aware of seller identities and adopt dynamic strategies of 
rewarding and punishing seUers. Sellers who perform as the 
buyer desires are rewarded with future business, and sellers 
who do not perform are avoided. Sellers recognize buyer 
behavior in developing their own dynamic struegies. 
A model developed by Klein and Leffler (1981) 
postulated a gualitv guaranteeing Drke {weak version). 
21 The principle is imbedded in equations (A4) and (a5) 
on page 481, Grossman (1981). 
22 Statement (A6) on page 481, Grossman (1981). 
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Buyers who observe a Regular delivered on terms that buyers 
would ordinarily expect a Super a<:t as if that seller will 
always deliver Regulars in the f.uture. A seller who has once 
"fooled" buyers will sell only Regulars at PR (see Table 1). 
If sellers anticipate this buyer reaction and if sellers expect 
one full period more in the market, then, given the 
parameters in these markets, sellers have an incentive to 
deliver Supers at any price above P5 - 10. Rational 
expectations and the law of supply and demand yield a model 
that predicts only Supers will be sold in the market and 
these will be delivered at a price of P5. As the end of the 
experiment approaches, sellers will sell Regulars at P5 and 
thereafter sell Regulars at PR. 
A natural extension of the theory to a gualitv 
guaranteeing price (strong version) can be applied even when 
buyers do not know seller identities. Buyers, once seeing a 
regular delivered to the market in the "high" price range, 
will anticipate that all future deliveries will be regulars. The 
resulting demand function will be that for Regulars. Price 
will immediately fall to the regular competitive equilibrium. 
Sellers know that a single regular sale will "spoil" the market 
for all. Thus, if the price is high enough, sellers will sell 
only supers. 
Other reputation models can be found in the literature 
(Rogerson 1982; Shapiro 1982a,c; Nelson 1974; Schmalensee 
1978). The thrust of these models is that sellers who feel 
that buyers can tailor their reactions to individual sellers by 
refusing to buy from them or by paying a premium to certain 
sellers will. in turn modify their behavior in anticipation. 
According to the model, buyers will patronize sellers who 
have a history of offering good grades and sellers will 
respond by offering good grades. The result in the 
parameters of our experimental markets will be that only 
'Supers will be sold. Premiums, prices above P5, might be 
paid to sellers who consistently sell Supers. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
The time series of all markets are in Figures 2 through 
22. Each contract is shown according to price and the 
ordinal time at which it occurred. Market efficiencies, 
summary statistics for each period, and the regime of 
treatment variables is also shown. Tables 2, 3 and 4 show 
average effidencies for various periods under each regime.23 
Comparisons of efficiency between different periods or 
regimes should be made cautiously because the periods may 
have occurred at different stages in a given market, there 
may be a different number of periods in the intervals 
compared, etc. In spite of these difficulties, the reader may 
find the tables useful in gaining an overview of our results. 
Conclusion I. When disclosures (if made) must be truthful, 
the full in for ma ti on model works well. 
Argument. The relevant markets (periods) are shown in 
Table 3. The full information model predicts all Super units, 
100 percent efficiency and prices equal to P8 in Table I. Of 
the 308 units sold during · the relevant periods, 275 (89 
percent) were Supers. On eight occasions an enforced 
warranty was imposed after the market had previously been 
operating under an alternative regulation and in all eight 
cases efficiency increased immediately. In three cases 
truthful disclosure was removed and in all three cases 
efficiency fell immediately. 
23 We are indebted to Richard Craswell for suggesting 
the classification scheme ·embodied in Tables 2-4. Market 
efficiency as developed by Plott and Smith (1978) refers to 
actual earnings as a percentage of the maximum possible 
earnings. 
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Table 2 
EPFtCIENCY IN MARKETS WHERE DISCLOSURES A.R£ PROHIBITED 
Seller ID Known 'Seller IO Unknown 
Experiment Experiment 
&Penods School Efliciency &:Periods School Efficiency 
Buyers 
Have: 
1:(7.8) BU 78% 1:{1-6) BU 71% 
15:(1-10) CIT 93% 2:(1-7) BU 77% 
Private 20:(1-9) CIT 87% 3:{7-9) BU 77% 
Information Average CIT 90% 4:(9-11} BU 77% 
Only Average All 89% 8:(1-6,9,10) CIT 76% 
9:<1-8) PCC 61% 
11:(9.10) CIT 80% 
Average BU 75% 
Average CIT 77% 
Average PCC 61% 
All 72% 
5:(1-7) BU 82% 
6:<1-12) BU '64% 
7:(1-12) BU 90% 
10:(1-6) PCC 76% 
11:(1-8) CIT 93% 
12:(1-6) PCC 71% 
Public 13:(1-6) PCC 71% NOTE: An all Regulars "Lemons' 
Information 14:(1-7) PCC 76% Equilibrium is 78% of the 
16:(1-7) PCC 73% Maximum Possible Surplus 
17:(1-8) PCC 58% 
Hl:(l-6) PCC 74% 
19:0-3) PCC 75% 
21 :(l-4) PCC 73% 
21:(5-14) POC 83% 
Av~rage BU 78% 
Average CIT 93% 
Average• PCC 71% 
A\'erage• All 75% 
"Excludes 21:(5-14). periods with low cost supers. °For these periods a "lemom 
equilibrium is only 56% of maximum surplus. 
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Table 3 
EFFICIENCIES IN MAi.KETS WHERE 'fRUTHfUL DrsCLOSURES ARE PERMITTED 
Adv~rtising (or Labeling or Warranty Pro\"ision) 
Advertising Must Be Truthful 
<Labeling, or 
Warranty Seller Known Seller Unknown 
Provision) 
Expenments Experiments 
& Penods School Efficiency & Periods School Efficiency 
17:(9) PCC 90% 3(1-6) BU 99% 
Is 18:{10-lll PCC 100% 4:(1-8) BU 98% 
~quired 8:(7.8) CIT 100% 
9:(9-11) PCC 97% 
Average All 97% All 98% 
10:(7.8) P<:C 95% NOTE: An all Regulars "Lemons" 
12:(7) PCC 99% Equilibrium is 78% efficient 
13:(7) PCC 90% 
Is 16:(8,9) PCC 98% 
-Optional NOTE: Public Information 
Average All 96% in all periods. 
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Advertising 
(or Labeling. 
Warranty 
Pro\;sion 
ls 
Required 
ls 
OPTIONAL 
RESULTS 
Table 4 
EFFICIENCIES IN MAR.K:ETS WHERE DISCLOSURES 
ARE PERMITTED AND MAY BE FALSE 
Seller Known Seller Unknown 
Expenment Experiment 
& Penods School Efficiency & Penods School 
None None 
14:(8.9) PCC 80% 
18:(i-9) PCC •78% 
19:(4-6) PCC 78% NOl'o'E 
19:(7-14) PCC 83% 
A\'erage• All 79% 
•Average excludes 19:(7-14), i.e .. those periods where the cost of supers was reduced. 
For these periods the all regulars "lemons" equilibrium is only 56% of the maximum 
surplus. 
CHAPTER JV Page 7-0 
The absolute levels of efficiency are "near" the predicted 100 
percent by the second period of ·enforced warranties. More 
precisely, the levels are above 90 percent in seven of seven 
second periods and at 100 percent in three of the seven. By 
the second period of enforced warranties prices in all cases 
are within 10 francs of the price predicted by the full 
information model. A vcrage efficiency for all periods was 
above 95%. 
Conclusion 2. The lemons model works well when seller 
identification is unknown and disclosures are prohibited. 
Argument. The relevant markets (periods) are shown in the 
right hand columns of Table 2. The lemons model predicts 
that only regular units will be sold. Of the 399 units sold in 
the periods in which seller identifi<:ation was unknown and 
warranties were unenforced 384 (96 percent) were regulars. 
Efficiency predicted by the lemons model is approximately 78 
percent in all markets. In the next to last periods of the 
sequences listed above, the efficiencies are within 1 percent 
(relative to full efficiency) of the lemons equilibrium 
efficiency. Average actual prices are within 5 francs of the 
prices predicted by the lemons model by the fourth period of 
all markets except market 9 where they are from 10-15 
francs too high and only slowly converging. Average 
efficiency for all relevant periods was actually less than the 
lemons equilibrium at 72%. 
Conclusion 3. The Grossman/signaling hypothesis that 
enforceable warranties will be voluntarily added to units (or 
that if disclosures must be truthful sellers will voluntarily 
make them) is supported in the data. 
Argument. The relevant periods arc shown in the lower left 
hand corner of Table 3. 24 Of the 72 offers in the relevant 
24 Some ambiguity exists about whether or not 
warranties were optimal or were required in 17(9) and 
18(10,11). Of the 43 offers in these periods, 37 indicated a 
Super, and of the 39 bids 36 requested a Super. All of the 34 
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pcriod'S, 53 indkated a Super, and of the 83 bids, 74 
requested a Super. Of the 65 Supers sold, 64 were supported 
by an expr~s warranty. Average "efficiency is 96%, about 
the same as when disclosures arc mandatory and truthful. 
Conclusion 4. Sellers will nontruthfully advertise when it is 
possible. The "pooling" of regulars posing as supers 
phenomena predicted by "the signaling models are observable 
when advertising need not be truthful (express warranties arc 
not enforced). 
Argument. The relevant periods are shown in the lower half 
of Table 4 in which advertising was optional but the implied 
express warranty was not enforceable. A total of 147 trades 
were made during these periods of which 105 were regula£s 
and 42 were supers. A total of 61 of the regulars sold were 
falsely advertised as Supers (58 percent) with the other 44 
advertised as Regulars or unadvertised. These 
misrepresentations are not random mistakes, because all of 
the 42 supers sold were also advertised as Supers. There 
were no "mistakes" at all. 
Conclusion 5. Knowledge of seller indentification in the 
absence of truthful but voluntary disclosure: 
i) does not guarantee efficiency improvements over the 
lemons' equilibrium, but in some markets such knowledge 
increased efficiency. 
ii) can continue to have an influence if grade is only 
privately disclosed. 
Argument. The relevant markets (periods) for part i an: 
given in the left half of Table 2 and the lower left half of 
Table 4. The relevant periods of experiments I, 6, 10, 12 
13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19(1-6), 21(1-4) have efficiency level 
insignificantly above that of the lemons equilibrium. For th, 
Super sales were supported by a warranty. 
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most part these efficiencies are close to the lemons model 
predictions, even though the price data suggest that buyers 
(especially inexperienced PCC buyers) are more optimistic 
than the lemons model suggests they would be. Experiment 5 
is on the borderline but the relevant periDds of 7, 11, 15, 
19(7-14), 21(5-14) have efficiencies substantially above the 
lemons model values. In addition, these markets shDw 
·evidence of improved efficiency ov.er time. The data in parts 
of 15, 20, and 21 compare favorably with truthful disclosure 
markets. 
Controlling for possible subject pool differences by 
comparing only experiments drawing from the same subject 
pool and in which seller identifications are known (for more 
than three periods) versus those in which they are unknown, 
the conclusion still emerges. Efficiencies in all but one of 
the nineteen periods of 5 and 7 are higher than the 
comparable experiments in the BU subject pool of I and 2. 
In the CIT pool, of the twenty-five periods of 11, 15, and 20 
all but two arc higher than the relevant periods of 8. 
Finally, in 11 efficiency goes down when seller I.D.'s are 
removed. The data in the PCC experiments are less clear 
unless the cost of Supers is lowered. 
The relevant data for part ii come from the CIT 
markets 15 and 20 in comparison with 8 (upper half of Table 
2). In all of these markets .grade was only privately 
revealed. Efficiencies in all but two periods of 1.5 and 20 
are higher than in all periods of 8. Average efficiency is 
about 90% for I.5 and 20, compared to 76% for 8. 
Conclusion 6. The signaling model works except where seller 
identification is known. Where seller identifications were 
known, the predictions of the model were less reliable and in 
some cases inaccurate relative to the full information model. 
Argument. The signaling model predictions coincide with the 
full information model when warranties are enforceable and 
with the lemons model when warranties are not enforceable. 
Both predictions are supported. When warranties are optional 
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but enf or:ced, the signaling model predicts they will be used. 
The i)redictions of the signaling model r.emain the same 
when seller identifications are known. In fact, the signaling 
model is basically a static model and, unless it is 
reinterpreted to designate "reputation" as a "signal," predicts 
that the market will be insensitive to the revelation of seller 
identification. Conclusion 4 demonstrates that the model 
fails at this point. 
Condusion 7. Buyer reaction to "ripoffs" is not that 
postulated by either the strong or weak versions of the 
quality guaranteeing price model. 
Argument. The reaction postulated by the model has buyers 
boycotting sellers who deliver Regulars at a price that· is 
unprofitable for buyers. Buyers necessarily lose money on 
any purchase of a regular at a price of 180 or more. 
Consider all experiments where unenforceable warranties 
existed, s-eller identifications were known, and there was 
public revelation of grade. On 25 occasions sellers delivered 
·a Regular at a price above 180 and were then able to make 
the very next sale at a price above 180. In 10 instances a 
seller sold a Regular to a buyer at a price above 180 and 
then sold to the same buyer within the next period at a 
price above 180 and without delivering a Super during the 
intervening time. The models predict that this will never 
occur. 
Conclusion 8. A seller's demand depends not only upon 
his/her own "reputation" for delivering Supers, but also upon 
the market "reputation." The Shapiro model (1982a), if it is 
to be generalized to multiple firms, must be changed to add a 
"market reputation" term. 
CHAPTER JV Pa e 74 
Argument. The following model was· estimated. 
P.r 
s .. r .• 
N 
c •. A.B 
T-1 T-1 
Ci + C2 • .E (S .. r .•• A•·l) +CJ .E (S .• r .•• B•·l) 
N 
.E Si,t-t 
i = 1 
t=l t=l 
price received by seller i in period T 
number of sellers 
constants to be estimated 
number of Supers sold by seller i in period T - t so 
T-1 
.E (S .. r .• • A•· 1) is own reputation a weighted sum 
t=l 
of all past Super sales by i. 
S .. r.. number of Supers sold in the entire market in the 
T-1 
period T - t, so .E (S .. r .• • B··•) is a market reputation 
= a weighted sum of all past Super sales. 
Paxe T5 RESULT 
The estimated coefficients are in Table 5. Data fro 
experiments 19 (monopoly) and 21 (low <:ost Supers) were n 
included. The conclusion stated above is supported by ti 
fact that six of the twelve exp·eriments have a significant 1 
term. 
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Table 5 
REGRESSION REsUL TS 
SELL~R PRICE AS A FuNCTION OF 
OWN REPUTATION AND MARKET REPUTATION 
EXP c, C, A C, 
5 215.16 13.16 0.958 -1.34 
C' s72) (34.50)"" (4:62)"" (7.232)"" 0.45) 
6 170.15 5.44 0.101 26.01 
(!\ & 106) (109.23)" (0.74) {0.083) (8.40)"" 
7 72.54 37.58 0.72 15.37 
(?" • 136) (5.53)"" (6.22)"" (0.499) (4.33)"" 
10 164.39 0.07 3.675 2.62 
(?" -59) (103.99)"" C0.13) (0.383) (3.42)"" 
11 283.49 1H6 0.547 -3.75 
(!\ -82) (22.93)"" (2.46)"" (3.041)"" (1.78) 
12 185.81 -1.85 1.314 3.34 
(?". 55) (13.66)"" C0.29) co. 729) (1.09) 
13 205.35 -7.48 -0.221 2.55 
(?" ·53) (16.51) (1.01) C0.211) (0.84) 
14 186.97 -0.61 -1.318 5.37 
{?' -67) (13. 74)"" C0.14) (0.555) (2.25)" 
15 206.92 22.36 0.367 4.55 
{?\ • 108) (11.71)"" (3.48)"" (2.190)" {2.12)" 
16 177.87 23.17 -0.501 1.81 
(!\ ·66) (28.57)"" (2.79)"" (1.185) <0.75) 
17 191.21 38.97 -0.200 -2.02 
<N ·62) (47.70)"" (5.~)·· (0.955) <0.63) 
20 162.78 17.37 -0.054 3.79 
<N ·94) (10.82)"" (2.46)"" <0.132) (} 65l 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
. sigruficant at .95 level 
.. sigruficant at . 99 level 
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B 
1.257 
(4.503)"" 
0.220 
(2.955) 
0.300 
(2.278) 
0.741 
(4.964)"" 
-0.741 
(0.173) 
1.093 
(2. 714)"" 
0.145 
(0.147) 
0.205 
C0.482) 
-0.200 
(-0.760) 
-0.023 
(0.012) 
-0.600 
<0.501) 
0.728 
(3.3461"" 
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Conclusion 9. The markets whue individual sellers prices are 
not influenced by either their own reputation for selling 
Supers or the market reputation for Super sales do not 
exhibit either lemons behavior or full information behavior. 
Furthermore, significant influence of individual seller's own 
reputation on own prices is not a sufficient condition for 
reputation-induced efficiency gains. 
Argument. In markets 12 and 13 neither C2 nor C3 is 
significant. Market behavior is not captured well by either 
of the two models. Both experiments 1-0 and 17 exhibited 
sensitivity to individual reputations, but neither exhibited 
substantial efficiency gains. 
The A and B parameters measure the "discount" rate 
over time -- whether past or most current Supers sales are 
most important. Those experiments for which A is small and 
C2 significant suggest the importance is on the most recent 
individual behavior. Where B is small and C3 is significant, 
the most recent market behavior seems to be the most 
important. 
Conclusion I 0. A reduction of buyer information about the 
grade deliveries of individual sellers from public information 
to private information decreases market efficiency. 
Argument. Because of subject pool differences in market 
behavior, the only opportunity to reject the proposition 
occurred in the CIT experiments (left half of Table 2). 
Because efficiencies at both BU and PCC tended to be low, 
little opportunity existed for further efficiency losses. The 
public r,evelation of individual seller's decisions in market 
11(1-8) at CIT produced efficiencies at near the 100 percent 
level. Efficiencies in experiment 11 (with public information 
and after period 4) dominate the efficiencies (after period { 
in both 15(1-10) and 20(1-9), where only private revelation of 
grade existed. The pattern of trades in the two private 
revelation markets is that suggested by the theory. Define ::i 
"ripoff" as a contract in which the price indicates that the 
(risk neutral) buyer was at least 90 percent confident tha 
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the unit would be a Super (270'.F), but a regular was 
deliver~d. In this <:ase a Regular is deliver{!d at a price of 
270 francs or more. In market 11 a total of four ripoffs 
occurred while twenty-eight and fifteen ripoffs occurred in 
markets 15 and 20 respectively. While no tests are provided, 
both prices and efficiencies appear to be drifting downward 
in 15 and 2:0 and upward in 11. 
Conclusion 11. A subject pool difference exists and subject 
experience makes a difference in market behavior. 
Argument. The best example is between CIT 11 and PCC 16 
and 17. These experiments had experienced participants, yet 
the market behavior of the PCC group is lemons, while the 
behavior of CIT is full information. Again an interesting 
comparison exists between the inexperienced PCC participants 
of 12, 13, and 14, which is difficult to describe in t{!rms 
other than overly optimistic buyers, with the behavior of 20, 
which used inexperienced CIT participants. Notice, however, 
that with some institutional arrangements, such as markets 
with unknown sellers and markets in which express 
warranties wue enforced, the differences between subject 
pools is almost nonexistent. 
Experience seems to be important in the PCC subject 
pool when seller identifications are known, and enforced 
warranties are absent. Compare 12, 13, and 14 with 16, 17, 
18, 21. The purchases that can be characteri,zed as made by 
overly opt1m1sttc buyers substantially disappear with 
experience. In brief, the models s~em to work better as 
participant experience increases. 
Conclusion 12. The time of revelation, whether revelation 
was made at the end of the period or immediately after the 
sale, made no diff eren<::e. 
Argument. Mark~ts 5(BU) and IO(PCC) had inexperienced 
subjects and the revelation came at the end of a period. 
Markets 12(PCC), 13(PCC), 14(PCC) had inexperienced 
subjects and the revelation was made immediately after a 
sale. Market efficiencies are indistinguishable. 
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Experienced participants in 6(BU), 7(BU) with revelation 
at the end of the perfod can be compared to participants in 
16(PCC), 17(PCC), 18(PCC) and 2l{PCC) when revelation was 
made immediately after sale. Market 7 with the credence 
property nad the highest dfici,encies. The others are 
indistinguisha bk. 
Conclusion 13. A reduction in the relative cost of Supers 
switched market behavior from that of the lemons model to 
that of the full information model. 
Argument. On two occasions the relative cost of Supers was 
lowered, markets 19(7-14) and 21(5-14). Prior to the 
lowering of cost the markets were essentially at a lemons 
equilibrium. After the cost was lowered the number of 
Supers delivered increased significantly as did efficiencies 
and prices. 
Conclusion 14. Aside from a possible small increase in price 
at first, nontruthful advertising had no effect on average 
price. 
Argument. Two of the three ,cases, in which warranti<:s were 
optional but unenforced, experienced a slight upward 
movement in pri<:e at first, 18(7), 19(4), but prices then 
returned to previous levels. The third case, 14{8) 
experienced no upward movement at all. 
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SUMMARY AND INTf:RPRETATION 
OF RESULTS 
The lemons phenomena can oceur (conclusion 2). We 
ai:e aware of no other clear d-0cumentation of its existence. 
Markets will not necessarily allocate information to the a:gent 
that values it most. Informational failure in a market ,can be 
observed. Of course this result alone says nothing at all 
about the likelihood of informational failure in naturally 
occurring markets. The result is important because it 
demonstrates that the tools and theories used to analyze 
naturally occurring markets were not rejected when put to an 
important test. 
With the existence of the lemons problem documented, 
the analysis turns to an examination of the conditions that 
generate it. The lemons phenomena do not automatically go 
away when firms have an incentive and opportunity to 
establish a reputation for good quality (conclusion 5). 
Reputation and brand names are not sufficient devices to 
guarantee efficient market operation even in the case of 
experience .goods and repeat purchases. 
Several factors can operate to frustrate the competitive 
development of reputations. First, the cost of developing a 
reputation is evident in several markets. Supers must sell at 
regular prkes in sufficient Quantity to attract buyers' 
attention and develop their confidence in the seller's 
reliability. Of course, this can generate substantial 
temporary losses. The problem can occur because the market 
price response must be sufficiently rapid to reward seners 
who adopt a strategy of delivering high-,grade units, and this 
price respon~e is not well understood. In fact, the positive 
responsiveness axiom that states that super deliveries will be 
rewarded by higher prices or increased demand is not always 
reliable. This axiom is at the heart of many models as in 
Klein and Leffler (1981), Nelson (1974), Peltzman (1981), 
Schmalensee (1978), Shapiro (1980, I 982a&b, 1983). 
80 
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Buy~rs might not even respond positively to high-.grade 
deliveries (conclusion 9). Instead of understanding seller 
motivations or believing that sellers have an interest in 
reputation development, ,.,uyers might regard sdlers as being 
totally random or buyers might even avoid sellers who deliver 
Supers on· the belief that the sellers were attempting to trap 
the buyer or lure the buyer into paying a high prke and 
then delivering a regular. While we cannot actually 
document the existence of such extreme buyer skepticism, 
some of the markets seemed to have that characteristic (i.e., 
markets 12, 13, 14), and in some cases it might even be 
justified. In summary, buyer reactions to poor quality 
deliveries are not as uniformly predictable or as punishing 
an<i rewarding as pr.esupposed by some dynamic models such 
as the quality guaranteeing price model of Klein and Leffler 
(con cl us ion 7). 
How a policy might alter belief and learning processes 
or even buyer reactions to seller strategies is an open 
question. Marketing programs or regulatory policies that 
"properly frame" the problem that buyers face might be 
important. Conceivably the very existence of some sort of 
regulation, even if unenforced, is a type of public 
information that might foster buyer confidence in seller 
intentions and also foster seller beliefs about buyer reactions 
to "ripoffs." With such changed beliefs the market would 
possibly provide the proper rewards for quality such that 
further regulation would be unnecessary. Because the 
partkipants have incomplete information, multiple equilibria 
might exist, and the existence of multiple equilibria might be 
the source of confirming results. A publicly stated regulation 
might serve as a focal point that coordinates a<:tions toward 
one of the equilibria. At this point theory provides very f cw 
hints and the issue is appropriate for more experimentation. 
Buyer confidence and learning is just part of the 
reputation cost problem. The confidence must be translated 
into price increases. Once buyers recognize a seller who 
reliably delivers Supers, the price of that seller's units mus1 
adjust sufficiently rapidly to reduce the reputation cost 
Data from experiments (Plott, 1982) leads one to suspect that 
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this pri.ce adjustment property is sens1t1ve to market 
organizational features independent of any learning propertks 
of buyers. The cost of reputation development depends upon 
the speed of price adjustment in response to changed buyer 
beliefs. Price adjustment speed appears to be related to 
market organization. Therefore reputation costs and the 
resulting evolution of quality products might be sensitive to 
market organization. Thus, empirical reasons exist for 
economists to have some interest in market organization, in 
addition to the theoretical propositions about the relationship 
between quality and market organization developed by Wilson 
(I 980). 
A second factor that can prevent reputation 
development from guaranteeing market efficiency is a type of 
externality that seems to exist in some markets. Individual 
selier success can be related to a market reputation for 
delivering Supers as well as to the individual seller's own 
reputation (conclusion 8). The externality can work 
negatively in two ways. First, individual sellers have an 
incentive to free ride on the reputations and markets 
developed by others. After one or two sellers have incurred 
the cost of reputation development and are successfully 
selling supers at a high price, an entrant can coat-tail on 
their reputations. Buyers will test units of entrants pri-ced 
just below the price at which Supers are being sold (price is 
a signal) and if the entrant delivers Supers, its reputation is 
almost costlessly established. The free rider aspect can 
dampen the development of reputations and the resulting 
market efficiency. 
The externality also can work negatively on a seller 
who has an established reputation. If other sellers decide to 
destroy their r.eputation by dumping regulars and thaeby 
make a profit on the ripoffs, buyer reaction can be negative 
toward all firms. Even sellers that continue to deliver 
Supers can experience a drop in demand as buyers appear to 
become suspicious of all firms. This negative externality can 
depress the returns from reputation development. Whether or 
not alternative market organization, public announcements, or 
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regulations can effectively promote the development of 
quality by reducing such externalities awaits further study. 
A third potential problem is structural and derives from 
the problems discussed above. If quality improvements can 
be achieved only by large and discrete increases in cost, 
marke{s might equilibrate at local equilibria that have the 
lemons property. The large discrete increases in cost mean 
that the cost of quality improvements can be covered only by 
large changes in pdce. Either the buyer must be willing to 
take a risk and pay a premium in hope that the seller will 
deliver a Super or the seller must incur large losses by 
selling Supers at regular prices in order to build buyer 
confidence. Risk aversion on both sides will make reputation 
development and the resulting high quality difficult.• In 
markets in which the relative cost of Supers is lowered, the 
instances of super ·saks and resulting reputation-like behavior· 
in the market becomes much more pronounced (conclusion 
13). 
A final problem also derives from the fact that multiple 
markets are involved. If buyers are optimistic and bi<l prices 
high even in the face of many regular deliveries, sellers have 
no incentive to develop a reputation for delivering Supers. 
The difference between the going prices of units that are 
being delivered as Regulars and the maximum value that one 
might get from a ~uper is not enough to cover the cost 
differential (see markets 12, 13). Before a reputation is 
worthwhile, buyer optimism must be dampened and the prices 
must fall to a point that makes reputation development 
profitable. Complete market quality deterioration, all lemons, 
might be a necessary condition for automatic market 
recovery. Commentators with a taste for paradoxical 
statements could say that things cannot get better -until they 
get worse; or regulation is needed least when market 
performance is at its worst. 
Market reputation development may be difficult in 
some circumstances, but it is certainly not impossibl<:. In 
some of the markets, knowledge of seller identification alone 
(brand names) was sufficient to guarantee behavior consistent 
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with the full information model (conclusions 5 and 13). This 
opens a possible role for third party actions that facili{ate 
such reputation development. Reputation development is 
clearly a tool. but we do not know its exact limitations. 
Voluntary .enfor<:ed warranties also will induce the market 
behavior that is captured by the full information model 
(conclusion l). Markets that are otherwise behaving in a 
confusing and inefficient manner recover almost immediately 
when enforced warranties are introduced. The power of the 
instrument in fostering market efficiency is remarkable. 
Legal instruments or practices that have the effect of a 
costlessly enforned warranty will be voluntarily offered by 
sellers. Such warranties, if they exist, will also be 
voluntarily demanded by buyers (conclusion 3). Such 
instruments require that any disclosures made are truthful. 
Competition, in turn, forces disclosures. The data in these 
experiments suggest that the Grossman/signaling models that 
predict the voluntary use of such instruments (when their 
availability is publicly known) arc reliable in this respect as 
models of warranty-like instruments. We are thus not too 
far from an understanding of the process through which the 
warranty-like instruments have an effect on markets. 
Further support for this type of theory has substantial 
ramifications for regulatory policy because a direct 
implication of the theory, when applied to experience goods 
as opposed to credence goods, is that mandatory disclosure is 
unnecessary. 
Markets need not be characterized by either the full 
information model or the lemons model. The reasons for 
such confusing behavior are not understood. Of course one 
can speculate that it reflects a lack of sophistication on the 
part of market participants or a lack of experience, or a 
number of things idiosyncratic to the population (conclusion 
11). The problem could be due to the existence of multiple 
Bayes equilibria as was mentioned above. These are just 
speculations that call for more detailed investigation. 
Precisely because the behavior of such markets is not 
understood, it is nec·essary for policy analysts to know when 
standard principles can only be applied with substantial 
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precautions. Markets that behave in understood pauerns arc 
"Characterized by either private reputation formation o. 
market reputation formation or both (conclusion 9). 
-Our final observation is related to advertising. Fals1 
advertising exists in our markets (conclusion 4) even whc1 
buyers quickly and easily detect the deception. Thus polic: 
analyses (Posner 1973, 1979) or models (Nelson 1970, 1'974 
that imply that false advertising cannot be sustained or wil 
be beneficial are not supported by our results. We hasten t 
add that conditions relied upon by Nelson were not presen 
in our markets and invites further experimentation.2 
Though false advertising occurred and the effects were nc 
benefidal, the effects (for experience goods) are aot a 
deleterious as presupposed by some advocates of advertisin 
regulations. People are not misled. They simply dismiss al 
sellers' oelaims so· that advertising fails to provide effe.ctiv 
information whkh ·could enhan.ce efficiency. This last findin 
may provide some insight into the advertising industry 
strongly voiced support for the FT"C's advertisin 
substaMiation program. 26 
25 The conditions are that advertising is costly a1 
sellers can increase market share. 
26 See Advertising Ag:e, November l, 1980, p. ' 
Tdevision/Radio Age, November 29, 1982, p. 35. 
APPENDIX I 
EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS 
GENERAL 
This is an experiment in the economics of market 
decision making. Various research foundations have provided 
funds for this research. The instructions are simple and if 
you follow them carefully and make good decisions you might 
earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to 
you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
In this experiment we are going to conduct a market in 
which some of you will be buyers and some of you will be 
sellers in a sequence of market days or trading periods. 
Attached to the instructions you will find some sheets, 
labeled Buyer of Seller, which describe the value to you of 
any decisions you might make. You are not to reveal this 
information to anvone. It is your own private information. 
The type of currency used in this market is francs. All 
trading and earnings will be in terms of francs. Each franc 
is worth dollars to you. Do not reveal this 
number to anyone. At the end of the experiment your francs 
will be converted to dollars at this rate, and you will be paid 
in dollars. Notice that the more francs you earn, the more 
dollars you earn. 
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO BUYERS 
During each market period you are free to purchase 
from any seller or sellers an many units as you might want. 
The value of a unit depends upon its grade. There are two 
grades (Regular and Super) and the value of a Super is much 
greater than the value of a Regular. At the time you buy a 
unit you will not know the grade but (at the end of a 
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tradin,g period) (after the purchase) you will be told the 
grade of each unit you bought. 
The attached information and record sheet will help you 
determine the value to you of any decision you make. 
Page of your information and record sheets contains 
two schedules. The schedule in the left column identifies the 
redemption values of Regulars and the schedule in the right 
hand column contains the redemption values for the Supers. 
The redemption value of the first Regular you purchase is in 
the row marked First Units and the column marked Regular. 
The redemption value of the first Super you purcha-se is 
found on the same row only, under the column marked 
Supers. The redemption value of second units are found in 
the second row, etc. The profits from each purchase (which 
are yours to keep) are computed by taking the difference 
between the redemption value and the purchase price of the 
unit bought. That is, 
your earnings = (redemption value) - purchase price. 
In addition to these earnings you will receive a capital 
payment of francs each period. 
Suppose, for example, the redemption value for your 
first Regular is 1000 and the redemption value for your first 
Super is 4000. If you buy two units at 1200 and one is a 
Regular and one is a Super your profits are 
. 1000 - 1200 = -200 
4000 - 1200 = 2800 
TOTAL 2600 
Turn now to the second page of the information and 
record sheet. The purchase price of the first unit you 
purchase should be listed in row two for the fir'St unit 
purchased. The purchase price of the second unit should be 
listed in row 2 of the second unit, etc. When the grades of 
units become known you should enter the redemption values 
in rows 1 for each unit. If, for example, your first unit 
purchased is a Super and if your second purchase is a 
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Regular, you r~cord the r<demption value for the first 
Regular because even though the unit is the second purchase 
it is only your first Regular. Profits at the end of the 
period should be recorded at the bottom of the pa'8e. 
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO SELLERS 
During <:ach market period you may sell to any buyer or 
buyers as many as units. There are two types of 
units, ·Supers and Regulars. Each . Super will cost 
you and each Regular will cost . Notice that 
the cost of Supers is more than. the cost of Regulars. The 
profits or losses on each sale (which are yours to keep) are 
computed by taking the difference between the price at 
which you sold the unit and its cost. 
Your total profits for a market period are computer by 
adding the prof its or losses on each sale during the period. 
The attached record sheet will help you keep track of your 
prof its or losses. Enter the price of the first unit you sell 
in the appropriate column (Super or Regular) in row I at the 
time of sale. Then record the profit or loss as directed in 
row 3. The sale price of the second unit should be listed in 
the appropriate Super or Regular column in row 4. Profits 
should be similarly calculued and the total for the period 
recorded in row 16. All profits over are yours to 
keep. 
MARKET ORGANIZATION 
The market for this commodity is organized as follows. 
The market will be conducted in a series of trading periods. 
Each period lasts for at most minutes. Any buyer 
is free at any time during the period to make a bid to buy 
the commodity at a specified price, and any seller with units 
to sell is free to accept or not accept the bid. Likewise, 
anyone wishing to sell a unit is free to make an off er to sell 
one unit at a specific price. All bids and offers are entered 
on the blackboard and remain there until accepted or 
I 
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canceled. If a bid or offer is accepted, a binding contract 
has been closed for a single unit at the specified price and 
the contracting parties will .re·cord the contract prke. Any 
ties in bids or acceptances will be resolved by random 
choice. Except for the bids and their acceptance or 
cancellation you are not to speak to any other subject. 
There are likely to be many bids that are not accepted, but 
you are free to keep trying. You are free to make as much 
profit as you can. 
Trading period 0 will be a trial period to familiarize you 
with the procedure, and will not count toward your cash 
earnings. 
FINAL OBSERVATIONS 
1. (At the end of the peripd) (After .eaeh sale) sellers 
indicate to the experimenter those trades that involved 
Regulars and those that involved Supers. This information 
will be transmitted to the buyers who partidpated in thos< 
transactions. Buyers can then calculate their profits. 
2. Each individual has a large folder. All papers 
instructions, records, etc, should be put into this folder 
Leave the folder with us before leaving. Take nothing home 
with YOU. 
3. We are able to advise you a little on makin~ 
money. First, you should remember that pennies add up 
Over many trades and a long period of time very smal 
amounts earned on individual trades can add up to a .grea1 
deal of money. Secondly, you should not expect you1 
earnings to be steady. you will have some good periods anc 
some bad periods. During bad times try not to become 
frustrate. Just stay in there and keep trying to earn wha 
you can. It all adds up in the end. 
Some people rush to trade. Other find it advantageou: 
to "shop" or spread their trading over the period. We arc 
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unaware of any particular "best" strategies and suggest that 
you adapt accordingly. 
4. Under no circumstances may you mention anything 
about act1v1t1es which might involve you and other 
participants after the experiment (i.e., no physical threats, 
deals to split up afterwards, or leading questions). 
5. Each individual will be paid in private. Your 
earnings are strictly your own business. 
6. "Buyers tender bids verbally by indicating rn 
sequence "(buyer number) BIDS (amount)." 
7. Seller tender offers verbally by indicating in 
sequence "(sclkr number) OFFERS (amount)." 
8. Each trade in a period will be numbered. (At the 
end of the period) (After each sale) each seller will (submit 
a slip of paper) (hold up a card) for each trade specifying a 
Super or a Regular. The selkr is free to determine the 
grade of the units he sells and may mix grades within or. 
between periods. 
R s 
Buyer 
-----
Seller ____ _ 
' 
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EXPERIMENT 1 ·"~-
Subject Pool: Boston Univers1tv 
Br.and Na•es: Yes 1-6. No 7.8 
Advertising: Prohibited 
BUYER SUPER.., PRICE SELLER BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER 
NUM&ER <YESzl l NUMBER NUMBER <YES=1 > NUMBER 
PERIOD PERIOD 4 
5 0 300 14 4 0 170 12 
3 0 300 13 1 0 175 16 
6 0 301 16 5 0 165 13 
6 0 301 15 3 0 1b5 15 
1 0 270 13 0 1b5 lb 
1 0 250 14 3 0 1b4 15 
5 0 260 15 2 0 1b2 13 
7 0 210 11 2 0 lbl 11 
b 0 205 lb 5 0 1-tb 14 
2 0 215 11 4 0 155 12 
4 0 1b0 14 
6 0 ;J55 11 
PERIOD 2 PERIOD 5 
4 0 200 15 4 0 170 f 1: 
b 0 190 13 5 0 16'5 13 
3 0 185 15 1 0 1bO lb 
b 0 185 14 4 0 160 15 
5 0 181 13 3 0 lbO 16 
4 0 180 lb 2 0 161 14 
l 0 181 lb 5 0 155 13 
3 0 180 11 0 155 15 
1 0 170 14 b 0 151 14 
3 0 150 11 
b 0 150 11 
7 0 151 12 
PERIOD 3 PERIOD b 
5 0 180 11 3 0 180 15 
l 0 179 15 4 0 1b5 1: 
3 0 177 lb 5 0 lbO 11 
3 0 180 13 3 0 lbO 16 
1 0 178 16 1 0 155 13 
5 0 176 15 6 0 1b0 15 
4 0 175 14 4 0 155 16 
4 0 1b0 13 1 0 155 14 
b 0 161 14 s 0 157 14 
5 0 155 11 2 0 156 11 
b 0 155 12 7 0 151 12 
b 0 151 12 
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~0UY£R SUPER? PRICE SELL£R BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER 
NUMBER <YES•l > NUHBER NUl'IBER <YES=t > NUMBER 
PERIOD 7 
4 0 lbO 13 
1 0 155 16 
6 0 lbO 15 
1 0 155 13 
7 0 155 15 
2 0 156 16 
5 0 155 12 
3 t) 155 11 
7 0 155 11 
4 0 155 14 
.'3 0 155 14 
6 0 160 12 
PERIOD e 
3 0 170 13 
4 0 160 16 
5 0 159 16 
1 0 155 15 
b 0 160 15 
5 0 159 13 
0 155 11 
2 0 156 11 
4 0 155 14 
6 0 156 14 
3 0 155 12 
7 0 156 12 
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1 EXPERil1ENT 2 
I Sub;ect Pool: Bost an Universitv Br&nd N-s: Na 
Advertisin9: Prohibited I 
BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER BUYER ~R? PRICE SELLER 
NUMBER <YES•l > NUMBER NUl'IBER <YES•l> NUHBER 
PERIOD PERIOD 4 
7 0 250 11 2 0 190 11 
2 0 230 13 s 0 179 15 
5 0 250 12 a 0 175 12 
7 0 275 15 3 0 170 13 
8 0 240 13 4 0 166 12 
s 0 250 14 6 0 165 14 
6 0 260 11 2 0 162 15 
3 0 290 14 5 0 159 11 
6 0 250 12 6 0 160 16 
8 0 255 16 8 0 155 16 
4 0 250 15 4 0 151 13 
6 0 230 16 3 0 155 14 
PERIOD 2 PERIOD 5 
5 0 200 15 2 0 175 11 
2 0 200 12 5 0 170 15 
5 0 190 13 8 0 170 11 
5 0 185 16 7 0 166 14 
7 0 190 15 6 0 165 13 
8 0 191 12 4 0 165 15 
3 0 190 11 2 0 160 16 
2 0 180 13 5 0 160 12 
5 0 183 11 3 0 161 14 
6 0 179 14 8 0 159 13 
8 0 177 14 7 0 157 16 
4 0 179 16 6 0 157 12 
PERIOD 3 PERIOD 6 
7 1 188 13 a 0 165 15 
7 0 181 11 4 0 1S9 11 
2 0 180 12 6 0 160 14 
5 0 180 12 s 0 lSS 12 
6 0 179 15 2 0 157 15 
4 0 179 15 a 0 155 14 
3 0 180 11 5 0 153 11 
8 0 170 16 4 0 151 12 
8 0 17.0 13 6 0 152 13 
s 0 166 14 3 0 150 16 
2 Q 165 16 2 0 150 13 
8 0 165 14 7 0 1S1 16 
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BUYER SUPER? PRI'CE SELLER BUYER SUPER? PRl'CE SELLER 
NUMBER <YES=l > NUMBER NUMBER <YES=l > NUMBE1i: 
PERIOD 7 
5 0 1:57 12 
2 0 153 12 
e 0 15:5 15 
3 0 153 16 
4 0 151 13 
6 0 150 15 
6 0 146 13 
e 0 145 16 
7 0 148 14 
4 0 146 14 
6 0 148 11 
4 0 147 11 
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EXP£R Il'ENT 3 I 
Sub_;ect Pool: BoRon Uni ver-si tv 
Br•nd N•-s: No 
Advertising: Required. Periods 1-6 Prohibited. periods 7-9 
BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER NUMBER IYES=l> NUl'IBER NUl'l8£R IYES=l > NUMBER 
PERIOD PERIOD 4 
3 200 11 5 326 12 4 1 300 12 4 325 13 :5 0 175 14 2 325 11 :5 280 11 1 1 305 13 2 1 320 12 3 1 305 11 3 0 175 13 3 1 299 12 2 1 310 14 4 l 298 14 l 315 13 5 297 14 
PERIOD 2 PERIOD 5 
4 330 11 4 1 329 12 4 329 14 5 l 325 11 2 1 329 12 2 1 310 11 3 1 328 13 3 1 302 12 5 1 328 14 1 l 300 14 5 1 325 11 4 1 298 13 5 0 179 13 2 1 295 14 3 0 178 12 1 1 286 13 
PERIOD 3 PERIOD 6 
2 1 328 12 4 1 320 11 5 1 326 11 5 1 325 14 4 1 329 12 2 1 305 11 3 l 327 11 300 12 4 0 179 13 4 1 299 12 1 1 300 14 3 1 298 13 4 1 299 14 s 1 298 13 5 1 299 13 3 1 298 14 
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BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELL£R BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER NUMBER <Y£S•l > Nl.J18ER NUP18ER <YES=l > NUMBER 
PERIOD 7 
4 f) 315 14 
3 0 190 12 
l 0 191 11 
5 0 195 14 
1 0 180 11 
l 0 179 12 
2 0 185 13 
4 0 179 13 
PERIOD 8 
0 180 12 
4 0 179 11 
5 0 179 12 
3 0 178 13 
2 0 178 13 
1 0 165 14 
1 0 165 14 
2 0 164 11 
PERIOD 9 
4 0 178 12 
1 0 175 11 
2 0 170 12 
5 0 171 11 
3 0 165 14 
4 0 160 13 
2 0 160 13 
l 0 163 14 
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EXPERil'IENT 4 
Sub;ect Pool: Boston Universitv 
Br.and Na-s: No 
Advertising: Required. periods 1-8 
Prohibited. periods 9. 11 
BUYER SUPER? PR.tCE SELLER BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER 
NUMBER <YES=1 > NUMBER NUMBER <YES=ll NUMBER 
PERIOD PERIOD 4 
2 0 50 14 8 325 16 
5 200 13 1 325 15 
7 1 210 14 3 1 324 11 
4 0 100 15 7 1 320 16 
5 1 230 15 6 1 325 14 
6 0 120 12 a 0 185 14 
1 0 110 11 5 320 12 
8 0 160 13 5 315 13 
3 0 140 16 2 315 15 
1 1 230 16 6 305 13 
6 1 250 11 1 300 12 
5 0 170 12 4 299 11 
PERIOD 2 PERIOD s 
5 1 300 15 6 1 320 12 
6 1 310 14 4 1 320 15 
5 0 170 16 5 0 178 16 
1 300 13 1 320 13 
8 ::;10 14 •J 1 3:?0 1:: 
3 300 16 2 1 315 16 
4 310 12 2 1 316 14 
7 310 11 a 317 15 
2 310 13 5 313 11 
2 1 300 15 7 1 305 13 
a 0 175 11 a 01 79. 14 
6 0 176 12 4 299 11 
PERIOD 3 PERIOD 6 
5 1 320 11 3 320 14 
4 1 320 15 4 320 12 
6 1 305 16 6 320 11 
a 1 325 13 1 315 16 
1 1 325 13 a 314 15 
3 325 14 4 0 179 16 
2 1 315 16 2 1 305 11 
1 1 320 11 7 306 14 
7 1 320 15 s 300 13 
1 0 175 12 6 299 13 
6 0 176 14 4 298 15 
7 1 :sos 12 298 12 
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BUYER 51.JF'f;:'.R? PRICE SELLER BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER 
NUMBER <YES•l> NUt1BER NUMBER CYES•l> NUl'tBER 
PERIOD 7 PERIOD 10 
8 313 11 8 0 220 12 
6 314 15 2 0 220 13 
3 315 16 5 0 215 14 
4 1 314 12 6 0 200 12 
1 1 305 15 5 0 200 15 
2 300 16 3 0 170 lb 
5 2'99 11 4 0 200 15 
7 300 12 7 0 163 lb 
7 1 298 14 1 0 170 13 
b 1 298 13 b 0 lb3 11 
8 297 14 4 0 165 14 
2 296 13 7 0 164 11 
PERIOD 8 PERIOD 11 
3 1 :sio 11 3 0 170 16 
6 l 305 12 2 0 170 16 
8 1 305 lb 4 0 180 15 
2 1 300 15 6 0 165 13 
1 1 300 11 7 0 165 15 
7 l 300 12 8 0 164 12 
5 1 297 lb 3 0 163 13 
5 1 297 15 6 0 163 11 
2 1 296 14 l 0 162 14 
1 1 297 u l 0 163 14 
3 l 297 14 7 0 162 12 
4 1 297 13 5 0 163 11 
PERIOD 9 
8 0 300 lb 
8 0 270 16 
3 0 180 15 
5 0 175 14 
3 0 179 11 
7 0 179 13 
l 0 180 13 
6 0 179 11 
2 0 175 12 
1 0 164 12 
5 0 160 14 
2 0 162 15 
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EXPERit1E.NT 5 
Sub_;ect Pool: Boston ,Universitv 
Br•nd NA-s: Yes 
Advertising: Prohibi~ed 
BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER 
NUMBER IYES•l> NUl1BER NUl18ER <Y£S=l> NUMBER 
PERIOD PERIOD 4 
7 0 215 14 3 1 255 15 
0 200 lb 4 0 255 12 
0 0 220 11 1 1 2b0 15 
5 0 200 11 4 0 255 12 
3 1 240 lo b 1 250 14 
8 0 225 12 2 0 200 lb 
0 215 15 5 0 220 11 
b 0 215 15 8 0 200 11 
4 0 205 13 7 0 210 13 
4 0 205 12 2 0 200 14 
4 0 190 lb 
7 0 150 13 
PERIOD 2 PERIOD 5 
3 0 240 lo b 0 230 13 
b 1 210 15 3 0 240 14 
1 1 240 15 b 0 230 lb 
2 0 215 11 1 1 280 15 
4 0 240 13 5 0 220 12 
8 1 215 12 7 0 200 lo 
8 0 200 lo 8 0 210 13 
5 0 200 14 4 1 230 15 
b 0 205 11 7 0 180 11 
3 0 211 13 b 0 175 11 
5 0 190 14 1 0 215 12 
7 1 190 12 4 0 175 14 
PERIOD 3 PERIOD 0 
2 0 210 14 b 0 225 13 
4 0 225 13 8 0 215 11 
1 0 230 12 3 0 225 12 
b 0 240 l 3 8 0 215 12 
4 0 230 16 4 1 290 15 
3 0 230 14 2 0 225 16 
5 1 230 12 4 290 15 
5 0 200 lb 2 0 180 14 
1 1 235 15 7 0 17b 11 
6 1 220 15 4 0 175 lb 
7 0 200 11 1 0 175 13 
2 235 11 5 0 170 14 
Pa:ge 1-03 EXPERIMENTS 
BU VER SUPER'? PRICE SELLER BUVER SUPER? PRl~E SELLER 
NUMBER l''tES-=1 > NUMBER NUHBER <VES=l > NUMBER 
PERIOD 7 
8 0 210 13 
3 0 21S 11 
2 0 200 16 
1 1 320 15 
5 0 190 12 
9 0 lS:S 16 
4 0 177 11 
7 0 176 13 
4 l 310 15 
6 0 178 12 
b 0 163 14 
7 0 164 14 
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EXPERll"ENT b 
Subj•ct Pool: Boston Universitv 
Brand Names: Yes 
Advertising: Prohibited 
BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER BUYER SUPER? PRlCE SELLER 
NUMBER <YES=l > NUl'1BER Nt.Jf'IBER <YES•l> NUMBER 
PERIOD PERIOD 4 
2 0 150 14 b 0 175 lb 
4 0 160 lb 2 0 17b 11 
7 0 155 14 7 0 175 11 
8 0 190 13 8 0 175 lb 
b 0 lbO lb b 0 lb5 15 
9 (J 160 11 3 (I 165 15 
4 0 lbO 12 1 0 170 12 
3 0 lbO 15 5 0 170 13 
7 0 lbO 12 4 0 174 13 
5 0 160 11 5 0 170 12 
5 0 1b0 15 
1 0 170 13 
PERIOD 2 PERIOD 5 
6 0 180 lb 7 0 175 lb 
3 0 175 lb 2 0 170 lb 
1 0 175 12 b 0 175 12 
7 0 179 12 3 0 175 12 
8 0 180 13 4 0 175 15 
4 0 180 11 B 0 175 15 
5 0 190 15 1 0 170 11 
1 0 175 15 5 0 170 11 
5 0 175 11 4 0 lb9 14 
3 0 170 13 7 0 lb9 14 
4 0 lb9 14 
9 0 169 14 
PERIOD 3 PERIOD b 
b 0 190 lb 7 0 173 lb 
2 0 175 11 2 0 174 12 
3 0 175 15 2 0 171 11 
1 0 175 lb b 0 174 15 
e 0 . 175 12 8 0 174 15 
7 0 173 13 3 0 173 lb 
5 0 171 11 4 0 173 12 
5 0 173 13 2 0 170 13 
4 0 172 15 1 0 170 11 
7 0 lb9 14 5 0 170 13 
1 0 lb9 14 
2 0 lbB 12 
Page 11)5 EXPERIMENTS 
BUYER SUP.ER? PRI~E SELLER BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER 
NUMBER <YES=l > NUt1BER NUMBER <YES=l> NUMBER 
PERIOD 7 PERIOD 10 
7 0 170 13 4 0 240 15 
3 0 170 16 7 0 250 11 
1 0 170 16 4 0 240 11 
6 0 170 11 a 0 220 15 
2 0 170 11 6 0 245 13 
5 0 170 12 
4 0 169 13 
4 1 169 12 
3 0 169 15 
9 0 169 15 
6 0 165 14 
9 0 163 14 
PERIOD a PERIOD 11 
6 0 170 12 4 0 180 16 
4 0 169 11 3 0 190 12 
3 1 170 12 7 0 173 16 
2 0 170 15 6 0 174 15 
5 0 170 16 a 0 172 11 
5 0 170 16 5 0 175 11 
1 0 170 15 5 0 171 13 
1 0 170 11 2 0 174 14 
3 0 170 12 
7 0 169 15 
6 0 168 14 
4 0 230 13 
PERIOD 9 PERIOD 12 
4 1 250 11 3 0 174 11 
1 0 250 11 4 0 174 11 
6 250 12 2 0 174 15 
8 0 172 16 
6 0 170 14 
7 0 173 12 
5 0 170 15 
3 0 170 12 
5 0 170 1::; 
2 0 168 14 
8 0 168 16 
5 0 166 13 
APPENDIX II P~ge 106 1 
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EXPERI11ENT 7 
Sub_;ect Pool: Boston Universitv 
Br•nd N•mes: Yes 
Adverti s'in9: Prohibited 
BUYER SUPER" PRICE SELLER BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELL£R NUMBER <YES=l > NUMBER NUMBER <YES=l> NUM8ER 
PERIOD PERIOD 4 
8 0 175 15 8 0 175 15 5 0 175 13 2 0 172 11 0 174 13 7 1 250 14 2 1 170 14 7 1 275 16 5 1 165 16 5 0 170 15 2 0 168 15 3 0 170 11 6 1 163 14 3 0 170 13 7 0 163 12 2 1 275 14 5 1 150 16 1 0 165 12 4 0 156 11 4 0 165 12 7 0 164 11 4 l 280 16 6 0 155 12 5 0 168 13 
PERIOD 2 PERIOD 5 
2 0 175 15 8 0 175 15 5 0 170 15 2 0 172 11 5 1 166 14 3 0 172 13 1 0 165 13 2 0 170 12 8 1 180 16 3 1 300 14 4 1 180 14 2 1 295 16 7 f) 161 11 4 1 300 14 0 165 11 7 1 300 16 2 0 170 13 6 0 166 15 3 1 175 16 5 0 167 11 3 0 167 12 6 1 290 12 4 0 165 12 1 0 170 13 
PERIOD 3 PERIOD 6 
2 0 170 11 2 0 173 11 3 0 172 13 3 0 173 13 
·1 0 172 13 1 165 16 6 1 170 15 6 1 290 13 2 1 225 14 8 0 170 15 8 0 170 15 4 0 171 11 3 0 170 11 4 300 14 5 1 200 14 2 300 12 6 0 166 12 1 1 300 12 1 0 165 12 2 0 170 15 4 207 16 7 1 305 16 5 208 16 3 1 305 14 
~--,---... c=---,....--···""~···· 
Page 107 EXPERIMEI' 
BUYER SUPER7 PRICE SELLER BUYER SUPER? PRI<:E SELLE 
NUMBER <YES•l> NUl'tBER NJ1BER <YES•l > NUl'IBE 
PERIOD 7 PERIOD 10 
2 0 173 11 3 0 17S 1 s 
3 0 174 1S 2 1 300 11 
7 0 :sos 12 2 1 300 11 
4 0 300 12 7 1 310 14 
3 0 170 lS 6 0 17S lS 
2 1 310 13 3 1 310 16 
3 l 310 14 l 0 305 12 
e 0 174 11 6 0 300 12 
7 l 300 14 4 1 :soe 16 
6 1 300 13 4 1 300 14 
4 l 16S 16 e 1 :sos 13 
s 1 166 16 :s 1 300 13 
PERIOD 8 PERIOD 11 
8 0 174 11 e 0 180 ts 
:s 0 170 12 2 I :sos 11 
4 0 168 12 4 0 180 lS 
6 0 275 ts s 1 310 16 
2 I :SlS 13 3 0 300 12 
7 I 310 14 7 1 310 14 
1 0 300 15 2 0 300 12 
2 0 174 11 4 I 307 14 
3 1 310 13 6 I :sos 11 
4 1 305 14 :s 1 300 16 
7 1 303 16 4 0 300 13 
3 1 304 16 7 0 275 13 
PERIOD 9 PERIOD 12 
a 0 175 IS 7 1 310 16 
7 0 17S 11 2 I 304 11 
4 0 17S IS 7 0 180 lS 
2 0 174 11 4 0 180 12 
7 1 310 14 3 l 309 16 
2 1 300 12 4 0 310 14 
7 1 300 12 e 0 180 12 
4 1 310 16 s 0 176 13 
3 1 :sos 16 3 0 175 13 
6 1 300 13 1 1 300 11 
4 1 303 13 4 0 :soo 14 
2 1 300 14 2 0 180 15 
APPENDIX II Pye IQ~ 1 
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EXPER111ENT 8 
1>ubject Pool California Institute of Technoloqv 
Brand Names Yes 
Advertising Prohibit~d. periods 1-6. &. 9.10 
Required. periods 7.e 
BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER 
NUMBER <Y£S=l> NUMBER NUMBER <YES=l> NUMBER 
PERIOD PERIOD 4 
4 0 125 9 e 0 170 
8 0 175 11 10 0 170 5 
10 0 140 9 12 0 170 3 
12 0 150 11 4 0 165 7 
e 0 150 7 2 0 165 9 
12 I) 150 1 6 0 165 5 
10 0 165 5 2 0 165 3 
6 0 161 1 10 1 165 9 
2 0 162 7 6 0 164 7 
6 0 165 3 8 0 164 1 
4 0 163 3 12 0 163 11 
2 0 165 5 
PERIOD 2 PERIOD 5 
10 0 166 11 8 0 167 11 
8 0 170 9 10 l 168 9 
2 0 170 1 12 0 165 
12 0 170 7 10 0 166 11 
: (l 170 9 4 0 165 3 
10 0 170 3 2 0 165 9 
10 0 168 1 6 0 165 5 
12 0 167 3 6 0 163 7 
4 0 166 11 2 0 163 7 
12 0 165 7 4 0 164 3 
6 0 170 s 12 0 163 1 
PERIOD 3 . PERIOD 6 
10 0 175 11 10 0 169 7 
e 0 167 9 a 0 165 3 
12 0 167 9 10 0 165 9 
4 0 166 3 12 0 164 1 
2 0 162 1 4 0 164 9 
2 0 165 3 10 0 164 5 
6 0 165 5 6 0 164 3 
10 0 165 7 a 0 164 11 
a 0 162 1 6 0 164 1 
12 0 163 7 4 0 164 7 
4 0 164 11 2 0 165 5 
6 0 165 5 2 0 165 11 
Pue 109 EXPERIMENT 
BUY£R SUP£R? PRICE SELLER BUYER SUPER? PRICE ~sELL£R 
NUl'18£R <YES=l> Nllt18£R NU"'8ER <YES=l > NUMBER 
PERIOD 7 PERIOD 10 
12 1 280 12 0 167 9 
8 1 290 1 10 0 170 11 
12 290 11 8 0 168 3 
10 290 5 10 0 168 3 
6 290 3 4 O· 165 5 
8 285 7 8 0 270 1 
6 285 9 2 0 165 1 
10 285 11 6 0 164 9 
2 285 3 2 0 164 7 
4 285 9 6 0 164 11 
2 285 7 12 0 163 7 
4 290 5 4 0 163 5 
PERIOD 8 
10 1 290 5 
8 1 190 1 
12 1 290 3 
10 1 289 11 
4 1 285 9 
8 1 285 1 
6 1 285 11 
4 1 285 9 
2 1 289 :s 
2 1 29 5 
6 1 286 7 
12 1 280 7 
PERIOD 9 
10 0 180 3 
10 0 185 1 
4 0 175 11 
2 0 175 5 
12 0 173 9 
8 0 173 3 
b 0 173 9 
6 0 165 7 
2 0 165 1 
4 0 164 5 
12 0 163 7 
8 0 164 11 
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EXPERI~NT 9 
Subject Pool: Pas;adena Citv College Brand N;aoaes: No 
Advertising: Prohibited. periods 1-0 
Required, periods 9-11 
BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER NUMBER <YES=l > NUMBER NUl1BER <YES=l > NUMBER 
PERIOD PERIOD 4 
14 0 260 3 04 0 175 1 10 0 250 11 12 0 173 7 8 0 245 9 02 0 175 11 12 0 250 s 06 0 174 7 12 1 250 1 08 0 174 1 12 0 250 3 02 0 17:5 11 ~ 0 235 7 06 0 174 s 12 0 17:5 3 12 0 174 9 
PERIOD 2 PERIOD :5 
14 0 185 11 14 0 180 :5 10 0 180 1 10 0 180 3 04 0 180 1 12 0 180 7 06 0 180 5 10 0 180 1 08 0 175 11 08 0 180 11 12 1 175 7 02 0 180 11 12 0 175 9 
08 0 175 9 
PERIOD 3 PERIOD 6 
10 0 180 1 02 0 175 3 08 0 175 7 06 0 17:5 1 06 0 175 3 08 0 175 1 10 0 173 5 12 0 176 3 12 0 177 5 02 0 176 5 14 0 176 11 10 0 176 9 10 0 178 9 14 177 7 08 0 178 s 14 0 177 7 04 0 178 3 12 0 176 5 1)6 0 179 11 10 0 176 11 12 0 177 7 
04 0 175 
Pag:C I JI EXPERIMENT~ 
BUYER SlPER? PRICE 5EU..ER BUYER Sl.PER? PRICE SELLER 
NUMBER <YES•t> NUl1BER Nl.t1BER (YE5•1> Nlll'1BER 
PERIOD 7 PERIOD 10 
14 0 17S 7 12 1 2BO 11 
02 0 177 s OB 1 2BO 11 
OB 0 17S 3 12 1 2BS 5 
14 0 17S 1 14 1 290 3 
10 0 17S 1 02 1 281 7 
10 0 170 7 06 1 2Bl 7 
04 0 17:5 s 06 0 174 3 
10 0 175 3 OB 0 175 9 
Oo 0 174 9 02 0 17S 1 
12 0 173 9 02 1 2BO s 
12 0 172 11 10 1 2B1 1 
Oo 0 170 11 06 1 283 9 
PERIOD B PERIOD 11 
02 0 174 s 14 1 2BS 11 
12 0 173 11 04 1 2BS 3 
OB 0 173 11 10 1 28S 3 
10 0 173 1 02 1 2BS l 
14 0 173 1 14 1 2Bo 9 
12 0 000 0 OB 1 2BS 7 
10 0 000 0 12 1 2BS 1 
06 1 000 0 04 1 2Bo 11 
OB 0 169 7 02 1 296 5 
14 0 170 3 12 1 296 9 
10 1 2BS 7 
OB 1 2B7 s 
PERIOD 9 
14 0 173 7 
10 0 179 11 
Ob 1 275 3 
04 1 277 s 
02 1 280 3 
14 1 28S 7 
Oo 1 2B6 1 
OB 1 287 9 
10 1 2B7 9 
12 1 28B s 
02 1 2BB 11 
Oo 0 17:5 l 
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EXPERIHENT 10 
Subject Pool: Pasadena City Calleqe 
Br.and N.a-s: Yes 
Advertising: Prohibited, periods 1-6 
Allowed, periods 7,8 
BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER 
NUMBER <YES .. 1> NUMBER NUMBER <YES•l> NUMBER 
PERIOD 1 PERIOD 4 
B 0 290 1 2 0 17S 7 
2 0 250 7 16 0 17S 1 
6 0 190 3 12 0 1 "P.5 11 
12 0 220 9 8 1 180 3 
8 0 200 7 8 0 175 5 
10 0 1:50 11 16 0 180 5 
2 0 tao 3 6 0 170 7 
14 0 180 14 0 170 11 
16 0 1:50 11 4 0 l7S 3 
8 0 1:50 9 10 0 100 9 
12 0 165 1 
16 0 165 9 
PERIOD 2 PERIOD 5 
4 1 160 5 12 0 170 9 
2 l 17S 11 8 0 170 7 
12 0 170 1 16 0 175 3 
6 0 170 7 10 0 17:5 1 
14 0 170 3 2 0 175 11 
8 0 160 7 4 0 170 s 
10 0 165 5 8 0 195 11 
14 0 160 3 6 0 170 s 
16 0 16S 1 B 0 190 7 
16 0 155 9 12 0 170 1 
2 0 155 11 16 0 170 3 
16 0 1:50 9 12 0 170 9 
PERIOD 3 PERIOD 6 
2 0 170 9 8 0 170 7 
10 0 180 7 10 0 17:5 11 
8 0 180 11 16 0 175 s 
4 l 175 l 14 0 17S 11 
2 0 16S 7 2 0 175 5 
8 0 170 3 8 0 180 9 
12 0 tao 3 6 0 175 1 
14 1 165 5 12 0 17S 3 
16 0 170 11 12 0 173 7 
10 0 175 1 12 0 170 3 
12 0 170 5 4 0 170 9 
6 0 170 9 
Page I J3 EXPERIMENTS 
BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER BUYER SUPER" PRICE SELLER 
NUMBER <YES•l > NUl'1BER NUMBER <YES=l> NUMBER 
PERIOD 7 
2 1 320 11 
lb 1 280 7 
8 1 275 1 
10 1 280 3 
12 1 290 7 
14 1 280 3 
10 1 295 5 
lo 1 270 9 
12 1 285 5 
2 1 285 1 
8 0 180 11 
PERIOD 8 
8 295 s 
12 -295 7 
10 295 3 
14 295 3 
8 29b 7 
lb 290 1 
b 295 9 
2 1 293 11 
14 1 295 1 
2 1 295 5 
4 1 295 9 
10 1 298 11 
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EXPERil"IENT 11 
Subject Pool California Institute of Technol'°Qv 
Brand Names Yes periods 1-S. No periods '9-10 
Advertising Prohibited 
BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER 
NUMBER <YES=l> NUMBER NUMBER <YES=l > NUMBER 
PERIOD PERIOD 4 
6 0 170 5 12 1 2'95 5 
12 0 170 1 6 0 165 3 
14 1 270 5 6 300 5 
1 ::! 0 170 1 2 1 290 1 
a 0 175 '9 16 0 200 1 
16 0 180 7 4 -1 30'9 '9 
4 1 280 '9 8 1 308 7 
14 0 170 11 2 1 300 7 
a 0 185 3 4 1 306 '9 
4 0 170 11 10 1 300 11 
16 185 7 
PERIOD 2 PERIOD 5 
14 280 5 8 1 310 3 
6 1 280 5 4 1 305 5 
14 0 :no 1 14 1 280 1 
12 1 300 3 6 1 300 5 
8 1 320 '9 14 1 270 3 
4 0 280 12 1 2'90 1 
6 1 280 11 a 1 310 '9 
12 1 280 11 a 1 305 11 
6 0 1'90 '9 2 1 300 7 
2 1 2'90 7 10 1 300 11 
4 1 2'93 3 10 1 300 '9 
10 0 300 7 2 1 2'95 7 
PERIOD 3 PERIOD 6 
12 2'90 5 6 308 5 
6 285 5 6 2'90 
16 1 250 3 12 300 
10 1 2'90 3 a 310 11 
a 1 315 '9 12 1 2'90 3 
2 0 170 1 4 1 300 3 
4 1 310 '9 16 0 200 11 
4 1 310 7 10 1 300 5 
14 1 300 11 14 300 '9 
10 0 170 1 2 1 2'9!5 7 
2 1 2'90 7 4 0 28!5 7 
12 1 280 11 16 1 30!5 '9 
Page 115 EXPERIMENTS 
BUYER •SUPER? PRICE i>E"1-LER 8U\'£R SUPER? F1HCE 
SELLER 
NUl'IBER <YES=l > Nl.1118ER· Nl.W1BER <YeS•l > 
Nllt1BER 
PERIOD 7 PERIOD 10 
6 1 299 :s 16 1 
:soo 5 
12 1 :soo 1 4 l 
24'0 11 
16 1 :S05 5 16 0 
175 s 
4 1 :SO:! 9 6 0 
180 3 
12 1 :soo :5 12 0 
180 1 
16 :sot :s 8 1 299 
9 
8 1 :soo 7 2 0 
175 7 
2 1 :soo 1 10 0 
175 11 
14 1 :soo 11 6 0 
170 1 
16 1 :SOI 7 e 0 
175 3 
10 1 :soo 11 4 0 
175 '9 
16 0 205 9 14 0 
170 7 
PERIOD e .. -· 
6 1 :sos :5 
8 1 305 7 
4 1 300 :s 
12 l :S05 11 
16 1 :soo 1 
14 1 :soo 1 
10 1 :soo 11 
2 1 :soc 5 
10 1 295 :s 
14 1 29:5 9 
14 1 29:5 9 
4 1 29:5 7 
PERIOD 9 
16 1 300 5 
12 0 300 1 
2 0 290 7 
16 0 280 7 
4 1 290 5 
12 1 28:5 11 
14 0 270 1 
8 1 299 9 
14 1 270 :s 
8 1 180 :s 
APPENDIX II 
EXPERIIENT 12 
Subject Pool: Pasad.na Citv Colleqe 
Brand Na-s: Yes . 
Advertising: Prohibited. periods 1-6 
Al lowed. period 7 
BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELL£R BUYER SUPER? PRI'CE 
SELLER 
NUMBER <YES=l> NUMBER NUMBER CYES•l> 
NUMBER 
PERIOD PERIOD 4 
2 0 80 1 6 0 
225 11 
10 0 100 3 14 1 
240 3 
12 0 100 s 6 0 225 
5 
14 1 100 3 4 0 
230 11 
8 0 100 7 10 0 
240 1 
12 0 190 7 2 0 200 
7 
8 0 150 5 4 0 230 
3 
4 0 160 11 6 0 230 
., 
10 140 1 14 0 225 
., 
6 0 210 s 
16 0 180 7 
PERIOD 2 PERIOD 5 
10 0 200 5 2 0 230 
.11 
14 0 220 5 6 0 235 
5 
10 0 225 
., 2 0 210 7 
4 0 200 7 2 0 
240 ., 
14 0 215 11 16 0 210 
7 
10 0 110 
., 2 0 235 5 
2 0 190 1 10 0 190 
3 
4 1 200 l 12 1 160 
1 
16 0 200 11 14 1 
200 ., 
4 0 200 3 4 0 
180 3 
8 0 200 7 
14 0 70 3 
PERIOD 3 PERIOD 6 
2 l 200 3 2 0 
240 11 
10 1 250 
., 4 0 235 5 
14 1 260 11 4 0 
240 1 
8 0 240 3 12 0 
210 7 
2 0 200 7 8 0 
215 11 
16 0 200 
., 2 1 220 1 
4 0 200 1 14 0 225 
s 
12 0 180 5 16 1 225 
., 
12 1 160 1 10 0 
180 ~ 
2 0 180 7 14 0 
210 7· 
16 1 250 3 
14 0 235 ., 
Page J J 7 EXPERIMENTS 
BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER BUYER SUP£R? PRICE SELLER 
NUMBER <YES=l > NUMBER NUMBER <VES=l> NUMBER 
PERIOD 7 
4 0 250 3 
2 300 5 
14 290 l 
12 300 11 
lb 300 9 
10 310 7 
B 325 5 
10 300 3 
4 315 9 
16 270 11 
b 310 7 
12 280 
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EXPERIMENT 13 
Sub.ittCt Pool: Pasadena Citv College 
Brand Na.es: Yes 
Advertising: Prohibited. periods 1-6 
Al lo .. ed. period 7 
BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER BUYER SUPER? 
PRICE SELLER 
NUMBER <YES=l> NUHBER NUMBER <YES==l> 
NUMBER 
PERIOD PERIOD 4 
2 0 100 3 2 0 225 
5 
6 0 120 9 6 
200 3 
2 0 1b0 5 4 0 220 
7 
6 0 1b0 9 14 1 
250 9 
4 0 250 5 10 0 250 11 
12 0 175 11 14 0 230 
5 
.... 0 175 3 4 0 250 ... 
8 0 200 11 4 0 200 
11 
14 0 175 1 8 0 220 
9 
16 0 180 1 6 0 180 
3 
10 1 180 7 
PERIOD 2 PERIOD 5 
6 1 200 5 6 0 230 
..;, 
2 0 200 1 14 0 240 
5 
8 1 175 9 4 0 200 
7 
.. 0 160 3 14 0 235 5 
16 0 250 1 12 0 240 11 
14 1 250 5 16 0 230 
2 0 225 9 4 0 2:?0 
11 
8 0 180 11 16 0 200 
3 
lb 0 ::?20 3 b 0 200 
9 
4 0 200 1 
16 0 180 9 
PERIOD 3 PERIOD 6 
lb 0 200 3 14 0 250 
9 
14 1 280 9 4 0 200 
7 
10 1 250 3 8 150 
7 
4 0 200 11 lb l 250 
9 
8 0 1b0 7 14 0 200 
5 
16 1 260 1 6 0 190 
..,. 
~ 
14 0 250 1 16 0 200 
b 0 2~0 11 14 0 210 
~ 
2 0 170 5 8 0 200 
11 
b 0 200 9 16 0 200 
..,. 
~ 
B 0 150 5 B 0 185 
Pag~ 119 EXPERIMENT 
BUYER SUPER? .f·RICE SELLER BUYER SUP,ER? PRICE SELLE 
NUMBER IYES=l > NUMBER NUl'IBER IYES=l> NUMBE 
PERIOD 7 
4 300 s 
14 300 3 
16 1 310 q 
s 1 320 11 
6 1 280 7 
2 300 1 
6 275 q 
16 300 5 
12 1 300 11 
::? 0 175 3 
1•) 0 190 
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EXPERU'IENT 14 
Sub~ect Pool: Pit.s•den& Ci tv Col leqe 
Brand Na•es: No 
Advertising: Prohibi4:ed. periods 1-7 
Al lowed. periods 8.9 
BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER BUY£R SUPER? 
PRICE SELLER 
NUMBER <YES=ll NUMBER NUMBER <Y~S=l l 
NUMBER 
PERIOD PERIOD 4 
6 1 150 3 10 0 
1BO 3 
12 0 BO 5 4 0 
175 5 
2 1· 130 1 16 0 
:!20 5 
B 0 70 9 10 0 
200 7 
2 1 200 5 B 0 
225 11 
12 0 90 1 12 0 
215 3 
14 0 80 7 16 0 
175 11 
16 0 100 7 4 0 
180 9 
4 0 230 9 6 0 225 
7 
4 0 175 3 16 0 250 
9 
16 0 100 11 
PERIOD 2 PERIOD 5 
2 0 225 5 10 0 195 
3 
12 0 185 3 4 0 180 
11 
10 0 200 7 4 0 220 
'5 
6 0 190 5 6 1 200 
3 
14 1 250 3 16 0 190 
1 
2 1 275 7 12 0 210 
11 
6 0 230 1 10 0 195 
'5 
16 0 240 11 2 0 180 
7 
4 1 180 11 16 0 200 7 
16 1 150 1 14 0 175 
9 
2 0 280 9 6 0 170 
9 
14 0 170 9 2 170 
PERIOD 3 PERIOD 6 
6 0 250 1 12 0 200 
16 0 200 3 6 0 210 
::; 
2 0 240 11. 10 0 :!00 5 
10 1 190 1 12 0 200 11 
12 1 230 3 6 1 190 1 
12 0 225 5 16 0 100 
9 
4 0 190 7 4 0 185 
7 
16 0 200 5 16 0 195 
7 
6 0 255 7 6 0 185 11 
8 0 300 9 2 0 175 '5 
6 0 180 9 
Page 121 EXPERIMENTI 
BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLE 
NUMBER <YES=l l Nl.Jf'IBER NUl'IBER <VES=l> NUMBE 
PERIOD 7 
12 0 190 1 
4 0 190 11 
10 0 190 3 
e 0 215 s 
6 0 200 s 
16 0 210 3 
10 0 190 7 
6 0 190 9 
4 0 195 7 
4 0 200 9 
2 1 170 1 
2 0 170 11 
PERIOD 9 
10 0 200 1 
6 0 200 5 
4 0 190 9 
12 0 200 5 
16 0 200 11 
4 1 210 1 
6 0 195 3 
10 0 170 11 
12 0 175 7 
4 1 190 3 
10 - 0 190 9 
14 0 175 7 
PERIOD 9 
10 1 200 3 
9 0 190 1 
4 0 190 9 
4 0 190 9 
6 0 195 :s 
2 0 170 s 
16 0 175 7 
8 0 170 11 
14 0 175 s 
6 0 165 7 
10 0 150 11 
10 l 155 1 
, 
l 
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EX PER Il'1ENT l 5 
Subject Pool <=•l i forni•. Institute of Technolo9v 
Br&nd N-es Yes 
Adv.,..tisin9 Prohibited 
BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER 
NUMBER <YES•l> NUHBER NUMBER <YES•l> NUMBER 
PERIOD PERIOD 4 
4 300 9 a 1 305 1 
14 1 300 1 16 1 303 5 
16 1 303 5 12 1 ::S03 11 
14 1 302 7 14 0 305 1 
4 0 170 9 16 1 304 5 
e l 303 3 10 l 301 7 
12 302 11 14 0 300 11 
10 302 11 4 1 302 3 
16 1 303 5 2 1 302 7 
e 1 305 1 4 1 300 9 
6 l 300 7 12 l 300 9 
12 0 301 3 2 l 301 3 
PERIOD 2 PERIOD 5 
16 1 303 5 12 0 303 7 
10 0 302 l1 a 1 305 
12 1 305 11 16 1 303 5 
2 1 305 7 a 1 301· 11 
e 1 305 1 14 1 305 7 
16 1 303 5 10 0 301 1 
14 1 305 1 2 0 301 3 
6 1 302 7 4 1 302 9 
4 1 303 9 2 0 302 11 
16 1 180 9 16 1 304 5 
10 1 302 3 4 0 300 3 
12 1 302 3 6 0 180 9 
PERIOD 3 PERIOD 6 
14 1 305 1 e 1 305 1 
16 1 303 5 12 0 302 7 
a 1 305 7 2 1 302 11 
10 1 305 9 14 1 304 7 
12 1 304 11 16 l 303 5 
2 1 304 3 14 0 301 1 
16 1 304. 5 12 1 305 11 
2 1 303 7 4 1 300 9 
4 1 303 9 2 1 302 3 
4 0 300 11 16 1 304 5 
a 0 300 3 4 1 300 9 
12 l 300 1 10 0 300 3 
Page 123 EXPERIMENTS 
·BUYER SUPER? PRl1:E SELLER BUYER SUPER'? PRl'CE SELLER 
NUMBER <YESzl > NUMBER Nllt1BER <YES•l> NUMBER 
PERIOD 7 PERIOD 10 
2 1 302 7 16 0 180 7 
8 1 302 11 6 0 305 7 
16 0 300 5 10 l 303 5 
16 1 303 5 4 1 300 9 
8 1 300 1 4 1 300 9 
14 0 301 7 4 0 182 3 
4 1 300 9 14 0 184 
4 1 300 9 6 0 181 11 
12 0 300 1 2 0 182 11 
14 301 3 12 0 305 5 
12 303 11 12 0 183 :s 
: (l 300 3 e 0 1e: 
PERIOD 8 
16 1 303 5 
12 1 304 11 
8 1 301 1 
14 0 305 3 
2 1 303 9 
4 0 300 1 
16 1 304 5 
12 0 302 11 
14 1 300 7 
4 0 180 7 
4 1 300 9 
2 0 181 3 
PERIOD 9 
6 0 300 5 
6 0 300 7 
8 0 300 1 
16 l 303 5 
14 0 300 7 
8 0 300 1 
2 1 302 9 
4 1 300 9 
16 0 183 11 
2 0 181 11 
14 0 182 3 
4 0 180 :s 
Aff~N:QIX 11 fll' 1~4 \ 
I ; 
EXPERIMENT 16 
Sub;;ect Pool: P•s•d1tn• Citv COllef1• 
Br•nd N•...s: v-
Advertising: Prohibited. periods 1-7 
Allo-d, periods 8.9 
BUYER SUl'"~R? PRICE SELLER BUV£R SUPER? PRICE SELLER 
NUMBER <YILS•1 > NUl'18ER NUHBER <YES•1 > NUMBER 
PERIOD PERIOD 4 
6 0 180 5 14 0 175 5 
12 0 180 3 10 1 280 7 
6 0 190 7 8 0 175 1 
4 0 180 10 2 0 180 1 
2 0 175 1 12 1 175 3 
16 0 175 9 16 0 220 7 
14 0 175 3 4 1 175 5 
6 0 170 11 10 0 174 11 
16 0 175 1 16 0 170 9 
" 
0 180 5 12 0 170 3 
12 0 175 9 2 0 170 11 
8 0 180 7 4 0 172 9 
PERIOD 2 PERIOD :; 
14 0 177 1 8 0 275 3 
6 0 180 5 14 1 275 5 
2 0 175 1 10 0 275 11 
10 0 170 11 10 1 285 7 
16 0 170 9 16 0 200 3 
12 0 170 5 12 0 180 1 
8 0 170 11 4 0 200 5 
4 1 170 3 2 0 180 7 
4 0 170 9 16 0 176 11 
2 0 180 3 10 0 175 '? 
14 0 175 1 
4 0 170 9 
PERIOD 3 PERIOD 6 
10 0 175 11 10 0 176 :; 
16 0 175 3 14 0 275 5 
4 0 172 9 16 0 175 q 
4 0 175 1 6 0 176 1 
12 0 175 5 e 0 176 9 
16 0 175 7 12 0 176 11 
6 0 179 1 2 0 176 3 
14 0 176 5 12 0 175 7 
8 0 176 11 e 0 175 
e 0 175 9 
2 0 175 7 
Pa.ge 125 EXPERIMEN1 
BUYER SUPER? PRl·CE SELLER BUYER SUPER? PfUCE SELLER NUMBER lYE'SclJ NUMBER NUMBER !Y£S•l > NUMBER 
PERIOD 7 
4 (l 175 5 
10 0 174 3 
14 0 174 11 
8 0 174 9 
6 0 174 1 
16 0 174 3 
2 0 170 11 
14 0 170 9 
12 0 173 1 
6 0 169 5 
12 0 169 7 
10 0 169 7 
PERIOD 8 
14 1 310 7 
16 l 300 1 
14 1 290 3 
10 1 290 5 
8 1 290 5 
16 l 290 11 
12 1 290 11 
2 l 290 7 
4 1 290 9 
10 1 290 1 
12 1 281 9 
10 0 175 3 
PERIOD 9 
16 1 300 5 
2 1 300 3 
4 1 295 7 
14 l 295 11 
2 l 295 9 
12 1 296 7 
6 l 296 l 
4 1 296 3 
8 1 295 1 
6 1 297 11 
12 1 297 5 
14 1 297 9 
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EXPERU'IENT 17 
'Subject Pool: Pas;adena Citv Coll•Q• 
Br .and N.-s: v-
Adv.,-tisinq: Prohibit~. periods 1-8 
Reqair•d. period 9 
BUVE'R SUPER? PRICE SELLER BUY€R SUPER? PRICE SELL£R 
NUMBER I VE:S•l > Nl.Jr1BER NUMBER <YES•l > NUMBER 
PERIOD 1 PERIOD 4 
12 1 190 9 12 0 195 11 
4 0 250 1 14 0 180 l 
12 0 195 11 6 0 180 3 
6 0 170 5 10 0 179 9 
8 0 166 3 4 0 180 5 
2 0 170 3 2 0 183 11 
10 0 170 11 4 l 200 3 
12 0 170 5 12 0 185 7 
2 0 165 1 8 0 180 9 
10 0 165 1 10 0 176 
PERIOD 2 PERIOD 5 
12 0 185 :5 12 0 200 9 
12 0 190 11 12 1 275 3 
6 0 180 1 12 0 2:50 1 
14 0 180 3 6 0 180 11 
4 0 180 11 12 1 280 3 
8 0 175 1 4 0 177 5 
12 0 210 5 2 0 180 
2 0 175 3 10 0 180 11 
10 0 180 1 B 0 175 5 
PERIOD 3 PERIOD 6 
12 0 195 5 10 0 195 11 
12 0 200 1 4 0 200 3 
12 0 180 3 10 0 180 5 
12 0 185 9 12 0 240 1 
4 0 180 3 12 0 275 ::; 
10 0 180 1 2 0 180 1 
2 0 179 9 6 0 180 9 
6 0 180 11 10 0 179 5 
12 0 280 11 
8 0 171 5 
Pag~ 127 EXPERIMENTS 
BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER BUYER SUPER'? PRICE SELLER 
NUMBER <YES .. 1 > NUMBER NUMBER <Y£5•1> NUMBER 
PERIOD 7 
12 0 250 1 
10 0 180 11 
le) 0 190 5 
14 0 180 ::s 
2 0 185 5 
6 0 180 1 
4 0 180 11 
e 0 176 ::s 
PERIOD a 
4 0 190 1 
12 0 180 s 
12 0 250 l 
2 0 210 9 
10 0 175 ::s 
6 0 175 11 
a 0 171 5 
10 0 166 ::s 
PERIOD 9 
.. 4 l 280 ::s 
6 1 280 1 
12 0 210 5 
4 1 280 11 
10 1 290 1 
12 1 290 ::s 
12 1 295 s 
2 1 290 11 
10 1 280 7 
6 1 285 7 
e 1 ::sos 9 
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EXPERit1ENT 18 
Subj.ct Pool: P•s4ld11n• Citv Colleqe 
Br•nd N4a.es: Yes 
Advertistn9: · Allmo.d. periods 7. 8. 9 
Required. periods 10.11 
lilUY£R SUPER? PRICE SELLER BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELL:ER 
NUMBER <YESsl) NUl"IBER NUMBER <YES•t> NUMBER 
PERIOD PERIOD 4 
12 0 180 3 2 0 175 1 
2 0 185 7 12 0 175 7 
10 0 180 11 16 0 174 3 
4 0 200 3 4 0 171 5 
16 0 180 9 14 0 171 9 
14 0 175 5 6 0 170 11 
6 0 175 1 10 0 170 11 
8 0 178 11 16 0 168 5 
14 0 170 1 10 0 168 9 
4 0 170 9 8 0 168 3 
4 0 167 7 
12 0 166 1 
P:ERIOO 2 PERIOD 5 
2 0 180 11 2 0 17:5 5 
16 0 175 7 6 0 170 7 
6 0 175 11 14 0 170 11 
12 0 176 9 12 0 169 :s 
10 0 175 :s 16 0 170 7 
14 0 177 5 10 0 168 5 
8 0 173 1 14 0 167 9 
12 0 172 9 4 0 167 1 
4 0 170 7 10 0 167 1 
2 0 170 1 6 0 167 11 
6 0 165 :s 16 0 168 3 
12 0 168 9 
PERIOD :s PERIOD 6 
2 0 180 5 2 0 170 
16 0 175 7 16 0 170 3 
10 0 170 11 14 0 167 11 
4 0 170 11 12 0 168 5 
14 0 173 s 4 0 168 5 
6 0 172 :s 6 0 168 9 
12 0 171 9 16 0 169 3 
14 0 170 7 14 0 168 7 
14 0 169 1 8 0 168 7 
8 0 169 1 10 0 167 11 
10 0 168 9 8 0 167 9 
6 0 166 :s 10 0 167 1 
............... , ................... 8lil~Udiiliiim 
'I 
Page 128 Page 129 
EXPERIMEN1 
ll'QIP 
·Sub_,ect Pool: Pasadt 
. a. '9 Brand Names: Yes 
10. 11 Advertising: Pr oh it 
AlloW4 
R? PRICE SELLER 
1) NUM8ER BUV~R SUPER? PRICE SELLER 
NUMBER <VES=l) NUMBER 
OD 4 
FER I OD 
175 1 
175 7 2 0 190 
174 3 6 0 175 
171 !5 6 0 175 
171 9 8 0 175 
1 7() 11 10 0 175 
170 11 ::? 0 175 
168 5 4 0 175 
168 9 10 0 172 
168 3 
167 7 PERIOD 2 
166 1 
4 0 175 
'OD !5 6 0 175 
1 (l 0 175 
175 5 2 0 175 
170 7 8 0 175 
170 11 ::? 0 1o5 
169 3 10 0 164 
170 7 
168 5 
167 9 PERIOD 3 
167 
167 1 10 0 175 
167 11 6 0 175 
168 3 4 0 175 
168 9 2 0 170 
8 0 17-0 
OD 6 4 0 164 
6 0 164 
170 10 0 164 
170 3 
167 1 1 
168 s 
168 5 
168 9 
169 ::; 
168 7 
168 7 
167 11 
167 '9 
167 
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&uv,e;R SUPER? PRICE SELLER BUYER SI.FER? PRJ~E SELLER 
NUM8ER <YES•l> NUl"IBER NU1BER <YES•1> Nllf'IBER 
PERIOD 7 PERIOD 10 
2 1 205 1 2 280 1 
10 1 210 1 
" 
1 285 1 
8 1 205 1 8 0 285 1 
10 l 220 1 10 0 280 1 
6 0 230 l 8 1 275 l 
• l 275 l 10 1 285 l 
• l 275 1 2 0 285 l 2 1 270 l 10 0 275 
PERIOD 8 PERIOD 11 
8 l 250 1 2 l 285 
10 1 250 1 10 1 285 l 
2 1 250 l 8 0 285 1 
6 1 260 1 2 1 280 1 
2 1 265 l 8 0 287 1 
2 0 270 l 4 1 285 l 
4 1 225 1 10 0 280 1 
6 0 250 10 1 285 1 
PERIOD 9 PERIOD 12 
6 1 275 l 6 0 290 1 
10 1 270 1 2 1 285 l 
6 1 275 l 6 1 285 1 
10 1 270 1 10 0 285 l 
4 0 280 1 10 0 285 l 
8 1 275 1 8 1 290 1 
2 1 280 1 2 0 290 1 
2 0 290 1 6 1 285 l 
Page 131 EXPERIMENTS 
BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER 
NUMBER <YESsl > NUHBER NUl'1BER <YES•t> NUHBER 
PERIOD 13 
2 0 290 
2 1 290 
6 1 285 1 
8 1 286 1 
2 (I 260 1 
10 1 280 1 
8 0 275 1 
10 0 270 1 
PERIOD 14 
8 1 275 
10 0 285 
2 0 280 
6 1 285 
10 0 280 
2 0 280 
2 0 250 
6 0 176 
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EXPERil1ENT 20 
Subject Pool C•liforni• Institute of Technoloqv 
Br•nd N-•• y-
AdvertisinQ Prhoibit.Rd 
BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER BUYER 
SUPER? PRI'CE SELLER 
NUMBER <VES•l > NUMBER NUl'IBER 
lV~S=-1> NUMBER 
PERIOD 1 PERIOD 4 
8 120 7 6 
0 170 3 
6 1 150 7 16 
1 270 11 
16 1 140 3 6 
l 2SO 5 
8 0 150 1 16 
0 170 ., 
16 1 160 
., 12 0 170 1 
4 0 150 11 4 0 
170 3 
2 0 170. 5 2 
0 170 7 
8 1 ::S25 l 10 
l 250 5 
4 1 150 3 8 1 
260 11 
10 0 50 9 10 1 
275 7 
12 1 lbO 11 8 
l 275 1 
4 1 260 
., 
PERIOD 2 PERIOD 5 
8 1 250 7 10 1 
250 5 
16 0 190 1 16 1 
290 11 
6 0 160 7 8 
1 :260 5 
16 0 180 
., 6 0 170 :s 
8 0 175 5 6 
1 270 :s 
4 0 175 1 2 l 
275 1 
4 0 170 11 16 0 
170 ., 
6 0 165 ::s 4 0 
175 1 
2 0 155 3 16 1 
290 11 
12 0 160 9 6 
0 270 7 
10 0 155 11 12 
0 170 ., 
8 0 270 7 
PERIOD 3 PERIOD 6 
10 1 270 7 6 
0 170 7 
8 1 270 
., 16 0 170 7 
16 1 265 11 12 0 
260 3 
12 0 170 1 6 
1 270 5 
2 0 170 3 e 
1 270 5 
4 0 170 3 4 
0 170 ., 
6 1 170 5 2 
1 270 3 
12 0 170 7 16 
1 275 1 
16 0 170 11 8 
1 275 ., 
12 0 175 5 16 
l 275 11 
e 1 270 l 10 
1 275 1 
12 0 160 9 4 
1 275 11 
Page 133 EXPERIMENTS 
BUVt:R SUPER? PRICE SELLER BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER 
NUl'IBER (V£S=1 > NUl'IBER NUl'IBER (V£S•1) NUMBER 
PERIOD 1 
10 1 275 1 
16 1 290 11 
4 0 275 1 
6 1 275 s 
4 290 1 
8 280 ., 
2 1 280 5 
10 1 280 ::s 
2 1 275 1 
16 1 280 11 
6 1 280 ::s 
8 1 275 ., 
PERIOD 8 
8 1 285 1 
4 0 295 11 
6 0 285 7 
10 0 290 1 
6 1 285 ., 
2 1 285 1 
16 0 285 11 
2 0 275 ., 
4 0 275 ::s 
4 0 270 ::s 
10 0 280 5 
PERIOD ., 
2 0 275 7 
10 0 275 ::s 
6 0 275 ::s 
4 1 280 1 
2 0 275 7 
8 1 280 ., 
10 1 285 1 
6 0 175 5 
12 1 230 11 
16 0 170 11 
12 0 170 5 
4 0 170 ., 
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EXPERil1ENT 21 
<Subject Pool: P&s&den& Citv Calleqe 
Br&nd N&_..: Yes 
Adverti sim;1: Prohibited 
BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER 
NUMBER <YESzl> NUMBER NUMBER <YES•t> NJMBER 
PERIOD PERIOD 4 
10 0 177 5 2 0 173 11 
8 0 177 11 10 0 170 l 
14 0 177 3 16 0 170 1 
2 0 178 5 8 0 170 7 
6 0 175 9 12 0 170 11 
16 0 175 11 4 0 170 5 
12 0 168 1 6 0 169 5 
e 0 168 1 14 0 170 3 
4 0 169 9 2 0 170 7 
10 0 168 7 10 0 168 9 
12 0 165 7 4 0 169 3 
4 0 168 3 16 0 169 9 
PERIOD 2 PERIOD 5 
10 0 175 11 10 0 170 9 
14 0 175 7 16 0 170 
2 0 175 11 14 0 170 
8 0 170 5 12 1 170 3 
4 0 169 5 2 0 170 7 
12 1 170 3 2 0 170 11 
16 0 170 1 14 1 200 3 
6 0 170 7 12 0 1~9 5 
12 0 lb7 9 16 0 lo9 5 
8 0 167 9 4 1 169 11 
6 0 168 3 6 0 170 7 
PERIOD 3 PERIOD 6 
2 0 175 11 2 195 11 
10 0 175 3 10 1 225 3 
14 0 170 5 2 0 175 7 
a 0 170 11 10 1 220 11 
12 0 170 7 2 0 190 5 
6 0 J.70 5 14 0 175 1 
16 0 170 3 10 0 175 1 
4 0 170 7 4 0 175 9 
16 0 169 9 8 0 170 5 
4 0 169 9 4 0 170 9 
16 0 170 7 
14 1 210 3 
Page 135 EXPERIMEN1 
BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER BUY,f;R SUPER? PRICE SELLER 
NUt1BER <YES•l> NUt18ER NUt19ER <YES"'l > NUMBER 
P~RIOD 7 PERIOD 10 
12 1 240 3 B 1 19!5 9 
10 1 235 11 2 1 19:5 9 
B 1 240 3 10 l 250 7 
14 1 220 9 12 1 250 7 
6 1 215 7 14 1 200 l 
16 1 215 7 10 1 260 11 
14 l 210 5 14 1 230 5 
12 0 210 1 6 1 200 l 
10 0 210 l 10 1 250 :s 
B 1 230 11 6 1 280 3 
a 0 230 9 B 1 270 11 
14 0 225 5 2 o· 225 5 
PERIOD a PERIOD 11 
12 l ·220 9 12 1 270 11 
16 0 220 9 14 1 2SO 5 
10 1 220 7 10 1 260 7 
B 1 220 7 2 1 260 7 
6 0 215 5 B 1 230 1 
2 0 215 5 12 1 230 1 
14 0 180 1 8 1 220 9 
4 l 245 11 14 1 220 9 
8 1 230 11 10 1 255 :s 
12 l 2SO 3 6 1 270 11 
4 1 250 3 10 0 230 5 
10 0 180 1 6 0 260 3 
PERIOD 9 PERIOD 12 
14 l 250 3 14 1 2SO 5 
10 1 250 3 12 l 250 5 
4 1 260 11 a 1 245 9 
10 1 260 11 6 0 245 9 
a 1 255 9 10 1 275 11 
a 1 250 7 10 1 260 7 
10 l 250 7 12 1 260 7 
4 0 2SS 9 16 1 270 3 
10 0 175 1 e 1 270 1 
12 0 175 1 4 1 275 11 
e 0 230 s e 0 274 3 
6 0 175 5 6 l 270 1 
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BUYER SUPER? PRICE SEU.ER BUYER SUPER? PRICE SELLER 
NUMBER <YES•l> NUHBER NUHBER <YES•l > NUl18ER 
PERIOD 13 
12 1 250 9 
14 0 250 9 
10 1 260 7 
10 1 260 7 
16 l 265 5 
12 1 275 11 
4 1 275 11 
B l 270 l 
2 1 260 3 
e 1 265 1 
0 0 260 3 
14 0 230 5 
PERIOD 14 
14 1 280 1 
2 1 195 9 
12 0 195 9 
10 0 260 3 
B 1 275 11 
10 1 270 5 
0 1 270 7 
e 1 275 7 
12 0 270 3 
10 0 285 11 
Iii 0 265 1 
B 0 175 5 
APPENDIX Ill 
As noted in the text, we chose an experience 
characteristic to model for its simplicity, rather than for its 
potential policy importance. Indeed, there is every r,eason to 
believe that "hidden" or partially hidden characteristics are 
more important for information policy than experience 
characteristics. In spite of the difficulty of interpreting 
experiments modeling "credence" or hidden characteristics, 
several have been run. In this appendix, we briefly 
summari2e the findings of these experiments. 
Plott and Wilde ( 1982) explored the extreme "hidden 
characteristics" or "credence" case wherein buyers never 
learn the true quality of the items purchased, that is, where 
the cost of ascertaining quality is essentially infinite. In 
spite of the extreme conditions, "lemons" markets were not 
observed. The experiments were designed to model a "repair" 
problem where, for example, an individual knows his 
automobile won't start, but doesn't know whether the 
problem is trivial and cheaply solved or serious and costly to 
repair. 
Buyers could ask sellers for a "diagnosis" of their 
problem. Sellers could provide a diagnosis based on a "due" 
that was specific to the buyer but which could only be 
understood by sellers. Buyers received neither direct or 
indirect evidence on the true quality of the advice they 
received from the seller until the conclusion of the 
experiment. Sellers' had a monetary incentive to always 
recommend the "high cost" treatment. For the sake of 
comparison, they ran similar experiments where the buyers 
were able to diagnose themselves. 
Although none of the markets behaved as if participants 
were fully informed, it did turn out, surprisingly, that the 
markets where the sellers performed the diagnosis were 
somewhat more efficient than those where the buyers 
performed their own diagnosis. This was true in spite of the 
incentive sellers had to try to "sell" the buyer on the more 
137 
expensive treatment 
competitive preasure lo 
sellers would give. tr 
would provide unbiased advice; thin 
them to be honest as well. WhUt 
was somewhat biased toward the td1h 
turned out that buyers in making their own d 
a similar "bias" in their purchases. 
The bias in both cases could have been 
subje<:t's failure to understand how to use the 
provided; instead they may have used a "r.epresentadYlft811 
heuristic" of the type studied by the psychologists, Kahnoman 
and Tversky ( 1982, 84-98). 
Delong, Forsythe, Lundholm and Uecker ( 1984) and 
Delong, Forsythe and Lundholm (1985) ran a series of 
experiments wherein buyers were subject to a random loss, 
but the probability of the loss would depend on the "<:arc 
level" provided by an agent of their choice. The buyers or 
"principals" would observe whether or not they sustained a 
loss, but not the actual care level chosen by the agents. In 
some of the experiments run by Delong ct al., buyers could, 
for a price, learn the true quality of the service performed 
by agents, and in some, agents were liable for a loss if it 
was discovered through a costly investigation that they had 
neglected to take "due care." 
All of these experiments allowed for the possibility o_f 
developing reputations and, in all, some sellers seemed 
con<:erned with developing a "good" reputation. Reputation 
alone, however, was not sufficient to produce completely 
efficient markets. In the unregulated (no investigati<>ns, no 
liability rule) markets, for example, two major sub-markets 
developed. One was a low price, low care level market and 
the other was a high price, middle care level market. The 
latter, however, was further segmented between agents who 
falsely advertised that they were providing the highest level 
of care and consistently recieved higher prices than their 
honest rivals. In fact, all agents fo this sub-market were 
supplying the middle (efficient) care level. 
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